Tackling Pakistan

The last six decades have presented India with many external challenges. Pakistan probably remains the most persistent and recurring amongst these. The challenge of Pakistan has varied, morphed but sustained itself in all its complexity and seriousness. Just as the fathers of India’s independence were perplexed by the seemingly fanatical zeal witnessed during the creation of the State, so are leaders today, in a bid to look for a lasting solution to outstanding issues.

The last six decades have witnessed unique trajectories undertaken by both India and Pakistan. Even as India remained steadfast on the chosen path of democracy – with a very brief interlude during the Emergency – Pakistan rarely flirted with the idea. And martial law remained its preferred form of governance. These extended periods of military rule brought in its wake conflict with India, imposed by ambitious rulers repeatedly willing to use military force.

The greatest prize of the Cold War was the debacle in Afghanistan of the erstwhile USSR. Pakistan spearheaded this campaign through the mujahideen who were trained and forged into a fanatical weapon of choice. This successful experiment was also attempted with reasonable success in Punjab to include training, equipping, funding and inducting terrorists into India. With Punjab floundering, given limited local support, Pakistan was ready to apply what was by now a tried and tested model in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The strategy to bleed India through a thousand cuts was put in place even as hundreds of innocents lost their lives at the hands of terrorists.

Pakistan also realised the threat that azadi could be to its larger aim of wresting Kashmir. This led it to create groups which initially sidelined the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and thereafter Hizbul Mujahideen, in favour of foreign terror groups like Harkat-ul-Ansar, Jaish-i-Mohammed and finally the Lashkar-i-Taiba. The local flavour to the movement was purged in favour of a struggle imposed on the State, purely for self-serving strategic gains.

Despite all these desperate attempts by Pakistan, years of efforts to sustain the struggle failed with the Indian Government succeeding in marginalising terror in the State. However, this did not stop Pakistan from pushing its agenda. Terrorism was employed beyond the boundary of J&K, as attacks were unleashed in the hinterland with strikes in Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Akshardham amongst other regions. These attacks brought home some bitter realities. First, for the rulers of Pakistan the conflict was not about J&K, as the stock argument often dictates. The aim reflects a larger design to destabilise India and J&K is merely one of the vulnerable spots, as was Punjab prior to it. Second, Pakistan is afflicted by the perils of a parallel state in the form of its army. The army’s status and importance emanates from the imagery of India. Therefore, any attempt to bridge the political and psychological divide is likely to be vetoed by this power centre. Power will continue to flow from the barrel of the army’s gun in Pakistan. Third, while it is difficult to assess the general mood within Pakistan in terms of the outlook of the population towards India, it is evident from the events of the last six decades in general, and of Kargil and beyond in particular, that irrespective of the mood and outlook of the population, the stakeholders who represent a state within the state, will continue to control the course of events.

It is this stark and harsh reality, which forces any practical approach to Pakistan to be seen through the prism of realism, rather than idealism. It was interesting to hear the interview by one of the most respected media personalities in India, Kuldip Nayar. While one agrees with the attempts to reach out to the moderate constituency in Pakistan as has been attempted by him over the years, reality suggests that this can merely be a subsidiary endeavour to far more hard-nosed negotiations that India needs to undertake.

This realist approach emanates from realities, which have undergone a more than subtle change in the last decade. First, while India had long since suffered Pakistan’s proxy war, the world realised the impact of this contagion on 26/11. The events of the day and beyond only cemented the reality of its role in supporting terrorism across the world. Second, from the time when India grew at the embarrassing Hindu rate of growth and Pakistan double that, realities have long since reversed. Today, India is seen amongst a select few countries which will shape the economic and geo-political world order in the course of this century, even as Pakistan stands on the brink of becoming a failed state. Third, India’s growing influence and role has since long taken it beyond the constricted space of South Asia, wherein, it prepares itself in every sphere including economic, diplomatic and military to undertake challenges represented by bigger powers and competitions. This requires a pace of growth in every field including military, which is likely to increase the already widening gap between India and Pakistan, making it redundant and irrelevant as a competitor. It will have the choice of partnering with India in peace and sharing the fruits of progress or tottering on the sidelines, overtaken by seemingly lesser powers in the subcontinent.

These changes bring forth the reality of the relationship India needs to pursue with Pakistan. The past has witnessed India in the gridlock of nuclear weapons on one extreme and a bleeding sub-conventional war on the other, with war not being an option, as indicated by Mr Nayar. It needs to be noted that nations fight from a position of strength on the ground of their choosing. India would be naive to expect that its appeal to moderate elements within Pakistani society will bring an end to the ongoing proxy war. The eternal lament of “what else can we do?” is not the only choice any longer. While war is avoidable, it should not remain off the table in any future eventuality. It emboldens the adversary to strike with regularity and impunity, through increasingly bold terror strikes in the hinterland.

Therefore, even as India strives to negotiate with Pakistan, it must do so from a position of strength – military and diplomatic. Disputes like Siachen should not become areas to cede space in the hope for greater leverage for the moderates in Pakistan. Affairs of nations are not affairs of the heart, where caution and the future can be bargained based on emotions. These are and must always be negotiated in pursuance of supreme national interest. And this has special salience when dealing with a country like Pakistan, which can barely be trusted given its past record. India has been able to achieve a degree of sustainability in areas like Siachen and on the LoC. Therefore, any solution in future must reflect India’s interests. The reality of the moment suggests that India can live with the status quo. However, Pakistan cannot.

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