India-China ties are a study in competitive coexistence amid strategic caution

Two developments this week offered a snapshot of the current state of India-China relations – one widely reported, the other largely treated as a sideshow. Together, they reflect the dual imperatives shaping New Delhi’s evolving approach to Beijing.

Mid-week, India announced it would resume issuing tourist visas to Chinese nationals after a five-year hiatus. Barely a day later, Prime Minister Narendra Modi – speaking in the UK – indirectly sounded a note of caution against China’s expansionist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. The former move signals a step towards confidence-building and groundwork for the next round of Special Representatives’ talks. The latter underscores the geopolitical lens through which India continues to assess China’s regional and global intentions.

Does this indicate a strategic dilemma that foreign policy commentators have long attributed to India’s China stance – especially after the 2020 Galwan clash? A more apt interpretation might be that both Asian powers, despite China’s significant lead, are navigating ties through a framework of “competitive coexistence”, a term recently invoked by a former Indian foreign secretary.

Five years after Galwan – arguably the most serious military crisis since the 1962 war – the two nations are simultaneously managing border tensions and responding to China’s assertiveness in the region. India’s decision to resume tourist visas followed China’s offer to reopen the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, both symbolic gestures of normalisation. These have come alongside high-level diplomatic exchanges, including visits to China by Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.

Last October, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia – though no full-fledged bilateral summit has followed. These steps have been made possible by disengagement and patrolling agreements struck at military and diplomatic levels last year. Yet, disengagement has not transitioned into full de-escalation. Troop withdrawals remain incomplete, and border tensions, while better managed, are far from resolved.

Another emerging common ground is both nations’ resistance to US sanctions targeting countries trading with Russia. India and China have maintained steady energy trade ties with Moscow, creating a rare point of convergence in their foreign policy outlooks.

Still, these areas of engagement exist amid a minefield of differences. 

The balance of power between the two countries is asymmetrical – China is a global heavyweight, while India remains an aspiring regional force. This disparity shapes strategic anxieties in New Delhi, especially with China's growing military ties to Pakistan and its posture in a potential two-front conflict.

China’s maritime assertiveness, whether in the South China Sea via its controversial “nine-dash line” or in the East China Sea, also raises concerns in India, particularly given Beijing’s “string of pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean. It was this broader expansionism that Modi appeared to criticise during his recent UK visit. For New Delhi, both continental and maritime dimensions are key to assessing China’s strategic intentions and power projection.

Alongside these strategic considerations, India must also weigh the implications of its growing trade deficit with China, which has nearly crossed the $100 billion mark, according to commerce ministry data. This highlights not only the significant imbalance, where Chinese imports far outweigh Indian exports, but also the depth of economic interdependence between the two countries. For New Delhi, managing tensions with Beijing involves more than addressing border skirmishes; it also means ensuring that any geopolitical rupture does not disrupt critical economic flows.

As India marks the 75th year of diplomatic ties with China, its approach is defined by two competing impulses: engagement to manage tensions and reap reciprocal benefits, and strategic wariness of China’s ambitions and behaviour. 

In the last five years, however, these twin impulses were waiting to find a point of blending, that now is reflected in New Delhi’s recalibration. In many ways, the theme of “competitive co-existence” expresses the current state of ties between two neighbours better than the thrust of conflicting hostilities. 

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