The Quad Quotient

Ten years after the idea was first mooted, the concept of the Quad comprising US, India, Japan and Australia – a sort of concert of four democracies to coordinate and cooperate in the Indo-Pacific – has been revived. In these 10 years a lot has changed in terms of relative power of countries. A new urgency has been injected by the abrasive, aggressive, assertive and expansionist behaviour of China. With the myth of peaceful rise of China being busted, and countries around the region feeling the heat of Chinese expansionism and bullying, the idea of the Quad, which remained in the cold-storage for close to a decade is getting a relook. But as things stand, instead of being a work-in-progress, the Quad is more of an idea in progress. The excitement and anticipation in the strategic community about the potential of the Quad isn’t quite being reflected as yet in any real move towards institutionalising or operationalising the Quad into something more than just a forum for consultation.

While all the four countries have held their first meeting recently, the fact that not only was this meeting attended by mid-level officials but also that each country issued its own statement about the take-away from the meeting, is a clear indication that the Quad is a long distance away from acquiring a formal structure. On its part, India has approached the Quad with a fair bit of caution. India’s initial response to the Quad proposal of the Japanese Foreign Minister was both cautious and correct. The spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs said India was “open to working with likeminded countries on issues that advance our interests and promote our viewpoint” and then downplayed the Quad by adding that India was a part of a number of such initiatives. He added for good measure that India had “an open mind to cooperate with countries with convergence but obviously on an agenda which is relevant to us”. This was a clear signal that while India would participate in the Quad, it wasn’t going to jump in headlong into an all-encompassing alliance with the other members of the Quad. The post-meeting statement of India was quite anodyne. It spoke about “consultations on issues of common interest in the Indo-Pacific region” and mentioned a “converging vision and values for promotion of peace, stability and prosperity” which was reflected in an agreement of all four countries that “a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large”.

At one level, there is clear recognition in India about the strategic utility of the Quad. At the same time, however, there are also troubling questions about the commitment of the other members to the idea of the Quad, and how deep will be the cooperation and coordination between these countries to operationalise the Quad into something more than a talking shop. All countries of the Quad have deep economic linkages with China and wouldn’t like to jeopardise or disrupt these. But they also have serious concerns about China. The Japanese, for instance, have not only had to put up with Chinese territorial claims but have also seen the Chinese use economic levers – blocking sale of rare earths, forcing a boycott of Japanese goods against them. The Australian economy is deeply dependant on China for growth, but Chinese efforts to influence Australian politics and public discourse is causing deep disquiet in that country. Plus, there is the whole issue of Chinese attempts to convert the South China Sea into a Chinese lake which would leave the trade of all countries hostage in Chinese hands. The US too has its strategic problems with China, but also has a huge economic interest linked to China.

The question is how will the strategic convergence on China among the Quad countries play on their individual economic and other interests in China. Will these economic interests subordinate to strategic interests? Given that it is a no-brainer that every country will try to maximise, or at the very least protect, its interests, what will be the point at which they will strike a balance between their economic and strategic interests? All the Quad countries are realistic enough to understand that the concept of containment of China is neither feasible not practical, and perhaps not even desirable. But equally, any expectation that strategic contestation and counter-balancing can move parallelly with ever deepening economic ties is also not going to be tenable for any length of time. Because if the Quad has to be effective in making China behave more responsibly and follow a rules-based order, then it has to go to beyond being just a forum for exchange of views. Merely setting up a forum for consultations is not going to impress the Chinese. If anything, the Chinese who are spooked by the prospect of Quad will push their weight even more if they realise that it is just a talking shop.

India’s dilemma is that if it shows too much keenness for the Quad, then it invites even greater hostility from China, which can be a problem if the Quad remains still-born; on the other hand, remaining aloof from a Quad–like arrangement isn’t going to change China’s inimical policies towards India. If anything, China has done everything to hurt India and even encircle it. To counter China’s growing aggressiveness, India will need the support of powerful friends. While some strategic thinkers in India counsel in favour of maintaining status quo, the fact of the matter is that China has already altered the status quo and the strategic space around India is currently in a flux. In this new setting, India has to find its bearings and work towards a strategic equilibrium that protects its interests. The Quad, if it becomes a reality, is something that can help bring about this equilibrium. But for this to happen, not only will other countries need to play ball, but India too will need to step into a brave new world of strategic alliances. This will mean that India will need to shed its strategic chastity belt and get over the fiction of strategic autonomy that it has sold itself for so many years. Strategic autonomy is a sexy slogan but means very little if you are a country without necessary technology, investible resources, military capability etc and confront a hostile neighbour which is a rising power not just economically but also militarily and diplomatically. In any case, entering into a strategic alliance doesn’t necessarily mean a total surrender of strategic autonomy.

For India, as well as other countries (and this means not just the other Quad members but also countries facing the overbearing Chinese) the Quad makes great economic and strategic sense. The very fact that the Chinese are worried about the Quad means there is merit in the idea. But it would be a folly to expect the Chinese to not do anything to sabotage the Quad. This they will do partly by reaching out to Quad members and being reasonableness personified. Partly, they will test the Quad by making some aggressive forays and if the Quad does nothing then it will die a natural death. Partly, the Chinese will try to wean away some of the other countries that could become part of a Quad Plus structure by pumping in money, or even browbeating them into staying away from any such grouping. This is why it is imperative that if the Quad is a serious endeavour then it must move beyond the baby steps taken so far, pick up pace and go to the next level of cooperation and coordination. Otherwise, this idea will fizzle out once again.

(Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation)