Trial by ballot: Can a ‘reform’ election finally stabilise Bangladesh?

Bangladesh approaches its parliamentary election on February 12 in a political milieu marked by upheaval, uncertainty and guarded expectation.

The political order that prevailed for more than a decade ended abruptly in 2024 with the removal of Sheikh Hasina and the disintegration of the governing structure built around her leadership. Since then, the country has been navigating an unsettled transition; competitive politics have resurfaced, yet the institutional framework that sustains democratic stability remains under strain.

The larger question emerging isn’t merely about who would take charge of the country; it goes beyond that. It has more to do with the nature of the state that will emerge from Bangladeshi society at the present moment of national experience. In many ways, it may signal an important point in state formation in Dhaka. 

A section of international commentary has partially recognised the salience of the current moment. An editorial comment in The Economist, for instance, argued that Bangladesh is attempting to rebuild political order after dismantling an over-centralised executive system. Still, the crisis is that the institutional scaffolding for durable democracy remains incomplete, if not terribly inadequate. 

The polls, therefore, represent an attempt to confer legitimacy on a system that is still redefining its rules and essential nature.

What could a new power calculus look like?

The exclusion of the Awami League from contesting the election has altered the political landscape. For decades, Bangladeshi politics revolved around the rivalry between the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). That bipolar structure provided clarity even when competition turned acrimonious. Its removal has opened space for new alignments while also narrowing the field. 

Supporters of the Awami League face uncertainty about representation, and the legitimacy of the electoral contest will depend heavily on turnout and post-election conduct. A competitive vote without one of the country’s historically dominant parties places additional responsibility on those who form the next government to demonstrate inclusiveness and restraint.

The BNP, meanwhile, enters the election with renewed confidence, strengthened by Tarique Rahman's return from exile. His presence has consolidated party structures and projected a sense of readiness for executive responsibility. 

Their campaign messaging has emphasised governance reform, economic stability and balanced foreign relations. That platform appeals to voters seeking predictability after years of polarisation. Yet governing after a period of upheaval demands more than electoral mobilisation. The BNP will need to show that it can manage coalition pressures and avoid replicating the patronage-driven patterns that marked earlier eras of competitive politics.

At the same time, the Islamist parties, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami and allied groups, have expanded their influence during the transitional period. Their organisational discipline and community networks have enabled them to capitalise on public frustration with corruption and elite dominance. Their rhetoric combines moral accountability with social conservatism, resonating in segments of the electorate that feel culturally and economically marginalised. 

Their role in the next parliament will shape policy debates on education, minority rights and social regulation. The degree to which mainstream parties integrate or distance themselves from Islamist partners will affect both domestic cohesion and international perception.

The gaze will also turn to the youth, who were seen as animating the 2024 upheaval but now face a different kind of reckoning at the ballot box. Students and young urban activists were at the forefront of the protests that led to the overthrow of the Sheikh Hasina regime. However, it remains unclear how representative the scale of youth mobilisation on campuses and in cities was of the country’s broader young demography. Visibility is not the same as representativeness.

Bangladesh’s youth population is vast and socially diverse, spanning rural workers, first-generation graduates, madrasa students, garment employees, and aspirational middle-class families. The radical edge of the protests reflected a segment of this demographic rather than its entirety. In the turbulence that followed, some strands of youth anger fed street vigilantism and a coarsening of public discourse that weakened already fragile institutions. The coming election offers a more disciplined arena for political expression. If the polls are conducted credibly, young voters may provide a clue as to whether the 2024 unrest can outgrow its lumpenisation and mature into institutional participation, or remain trapped in episodic mobilisation.

But one also can’t lose sight of the fact that economic pressures are also building an underlying context for the politics to navigate. Bangladesh remains dependent on garment exports and remittances, and faces competitive challenges as it transitions out of least-developed country status. Inflation and employment concerns have sharpened voter expectations. Many citizens are more interested in tangible improvements in daily life than in ideological realignment. 

The government that emerges from this election will need to reassure investors while responding to domestic demands for equity and opportunity. Managing that balance requires administrative competence and policy continuity.

Recent incidents involving attacks and killings of members of the Hindu minority community have made their way to the local news cycle. They are unlikely to have a bearing on the electoral matrix but could mirror the ascendance or anxieties of new forms of social assertion in the polity. 

New Delhi’s high-stakes caution

New Delhi would be keeping a keen eye on the polls in its eastern neighbour. The Indian dimension of this election extends beyond routine bilateral engagement. During the tenure of Sheikh Hasina, India and Bangladesh developed close cooperation in security, connectivity and energy. That period produced stability along the border and improved counterinsurgency coordination. The political changes of 2024 unsettled that equilibrium. Dhaka’s request for Hasina’s extradition placed New Delhi in a delicate position. 

As I had assessed in an earlier piece, the dilemma for Delhi is strategic rather than sentimental. Complying with extradition requests could strain established relationships and raise legal complexities. Refusing outright risks appears partisan at a time when Bangladeshi politics is recalibrating.

India’s approach in recent months has reflected caution. Official statements have emphasised legal processes and the importance of stable bilateral ties. The government in New Delhi recognises that overt alignment with any political faction in Dhaka may generate nationalist backlash within Bangladesh. Public opinion there has grown more sensitive to perceptions of external influence. Engagement, therefore, has shifted toward a quieter, institution-based strategy focused on border management, trade corridors and energy interdependence.

The recent tensions around cricket fixtures and public commentary illustrate how quickly sentiment can escalate. Sporting exchanges often mirror political atmospherics. However, structural ties between the two countries remain robust. Electricity trade, infrastructure connectivity, and people-to-people exchanges continue despite diplomatic friction. India’s primary objectives remain unchanged. Border stability, counterterrorism cooperation, and the prevention of strategic encirclement by rival powers guide policy. The method of pursuit has evolved toward lower visibility and broader outreach.

China’s expanding presence in Bangladesh adds another layer to the regional equation. Infrastructure investments and financial engagement provide Dhaka with alternatives and leverage in negotiations. Western governments focus on electoral transparency and human rights, yet their influence is moderated by strategic competition and economic interests. Bangladesh is likely to maintain a diversified foreign policy, seeking economic opportunity from multiple partners while guarding sovereignty.

The internal political transition and external recalibration intersect in significant ways. A government that demonstrates institutional maturity and minority protection will find it easier to sustain balanced relations with India and other partners. Conversely, a government perceived as exclusionary or unstable would complicate regional cooperation. South Asia’s security environment remains sensitive, and developments in Bangladesh reverberate across the subcontinent.

The republic’s reset: More than a vote

The election, therefore, represents a pivotal moment in Bangladesh’s effort to move from regime change to durable governance. Voters are weighing stability against reform, familiarity against renewal. The absence of the Awami League creates both opportunity and risk. The BNP and its potential allies have a chance to establish a new pattern of political conduct. That opportunity carries the obligation to integrate dissenting voices and protect vulnerable communities.

Regional actors, particularly India, will interpret the outcome through the lens of strategic continuity and diplomatic flexibility. A stable and inclusive Bangladesh contributes to regional equilibrium. A polarised or uncertain one generates ripple effects that extend beyond its borders.

On the eve of the vote, Bangladesh stands in a state of cautious anticipation. The underlying question that Bangladesh will try to answer in these polls is very elementary – what is the organised society on which the Bangladeshi state is erected? It’s another thing that the legitimacy of answering that question will be questioned. The deregistration of the Awami League, for instance, is making a part of the political space conspicuous by its absence. But with things standing as they are, the new order would seek legitimacy from the electoral verdict and will soon need to get to task with the challenges of economic pressures, institutional repair, and the delicate management of regional relationships.

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