‘New Nepal’, old anxieties: Will a Gen Z mandate trigger a new playbook for South Block?

With the close of nominations, the contours of Nepal’s next parliamentary contest on March 5, 2026, have begun to take shape. These elections carry profound implications for India’s strategic interests. The voting comes after a violent Gen Z uprising that ousted the Oli government in September 2025 and reinstated Nepal’s first female PM, Sushila Karki, as an interim leader. What initially gained momentum as a youth protest against a government ban on social media platforms has now evolved into strong opposition to the political system, replete with decades of unstable coalitions, corruption, and inadequate governance by the same parties rotating in power. 

For India, this election is important for both fundamental and immediate reasons. Both countries share a 1,751-kilometre open border across five Indian states, with millions of Nepalis living and working in India, and have a shared history of culture and trade. Strategically, Nepal controls access to Tibet and serves as an important buffer between China and India. The country has enormous hydroelectric potential, with 40,000MW of economically viable capacity, which can address India’s growing energy needs. Political instability or unsupportive governments may put these vital interests directly at risk. In this sense, these elections will be a decisive factor.

114 parties, 19 million voters: Decoding Nepal’s messy math

Nepal employs a mixed electoral system comprising 165 first-past-the-post (FPTP) constituency seats (similar to India) and 110 proportional representation seats. With no outright majorities, coalitions are the norm – Nepal has seen 14 governments in just 15 years. These frequent government collapses have created policy discontinuity, fuelling voter frustration and fatigue with development over the decades. Alternatively, the March election features 114 political parties, up from 87 in 2022. While it increases the probability of vote splitting, it also shows calculated new formations nested to channelise youth frustration into electoral success. Over a million voters have registered in the cumulative 19 million electorate, with the young ones potentially decisive.

The elections pit Nepal’s establishment parties, including the Nepali Congress (recently split) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), against various communist factions that have governed the state through 14 coalitions, as well as rising popular faces aiming to represent Gen Z, such as Kathmandu Mayor Balen Shah. After joining the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Shah has pitched himself as the first anti-establishment alternative. While winning Kathmandu's mayoral election in 2022 as an independent, he showcased his capacity to mobilise urban youth and middle-class voters frustrated with the traditional parties. Joining as RSP’s PM candidate, and potentially contesting KP Oli’s Jhapa 5 (seat) stronghold, Shah demonstrates his ambition for a national breakthrough.

What does it mean for India?

From an Indian perspective, both narratives present opportunities and risks for India's strategic interests. Traditional parties, despite their flaws, understand fundamental realities that have shaped and governed India-Nepal relations. They recognise that open-border labour migration generates remittances; that India’s security concerns about China's military presence in Nepal also influence Nepal’s own strategic autonomy; and that any development or economic assistance received from India is likely to trickle down to most Nepalis. Often criticised as tilting towards China, even KP Oli maintained working relations with India during his various interactions as the former PM. Largely, the predictability of traditional parties carries value. Even if they engage in anti-India rhetoric for domestic consumption, they would generally avoid crossing red lines that would fundamentally rupture the relationship.

Emerging popular leaders like the RSP’s Balen Shah, who rose to prominence during the youth protests, represent a genuine unknown. Optimistically, Shah’s anti-corruption posture could produce a more stable and transparent governance, and may help in the efficient implementation of India-Nepal projects that have hitherto been stalled due to political paralysis. This is likely to create a more pragmatic foreign policy, rather than unnecessary, overcalculated ideological posturing. If Shah delivers on these types of promises, India would gain a reliable and accountable partner in Kathmandu. 

On the other side is a heavy risk. Nepal is witnessing a personality-driven movement that may govern coalition politics. Shah has no track record in foreign policy, and his positions on the Kalapani territorial dispute, trade terms, or hydroelectric agreements are murky. The Gen Z movement that toppled the Oli government is also sceptical of all establishment actors rooted in the old order, and, to prove his nationalist credentials, some actions could appear unnecessarily confrontational. Moreover, without established ties with India, many believe Beijing will court the new Nepali government, potentially offering infrastructure investments.

What can we expect?

As of now, analysts say there is no outright majority, suggesting a greater probability of a coalition government. While the Gen Z movement is treated as a monolithic force, it has yet to develop organisational depth beyond protest mobilisation. Moreover, the urban-rural disconnect within youth politics may affect national electoral reach. On the other hand, anti-incumbency sentiment against established parties runs deep, but the nature of this anger is diffused rather than concentrated. With 114 parties competing, anti-incumbency votes could split across alternatives, giving traditional parties an edge in plurality constituencies. Moreover, Shah’s base appears to be overwhelmingly urban, concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley and major towns among the educated, middle class, and digitally connected youth. However, a great majority of Nepal’s electorate remains rural, informed with different priorities that involve patronage relationships and ethnic representation enveloped in interests aligned with local development. 

Among the 165 FPTP constituencies, patron-client networks could still prevail even amid national anti-incumbency sentiment in many rural districts. This creates several possibilities – traditional parties following another iteration of a power-sharing arrangement; Shah leading the coalition if RSP performs exceptionally well, or fragmented paralysis if no clear alliances emerge. The China dimension looms large over these calculations. With a commitment of $3 billion in loans to Nepal through the Belt and Road initiative, and knowing Nepal’s debt sensitivity, China is likely to position itself as a dominant alternative to India.

India’s challenge is to navigate through this uncertainty without appearing to interfere. The perception of India meddling (real or imagined) has historically damaged bilateral relations, as memories of the 2015 economic blockade and 2020 territorial map dispute repeatedly show. However, excessive caution risks giving space to China. For Nepal, these elections demonstrate whether youth demand for accountability can actually translate into governance that provides jobs, development, and stability, or whether they will be another exercise in reshuffling elites without addressing the core issues of corruption and governance. 

(Devesh Kumar is a Research Associate at Lokniti-CSDS and works on elections and democracy. Views expressed are personal and do not reflect the views of their institution.)

At Newslaundry, we believe in holding power to account. Our journalism is truly in the public interest – funded by our subscribers, not by ad revenue from corporations and governments. You can help. Click here and join the tribe that pays to keep news free.