India’s high-visibility diplomatic campaign to secure admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suffered a setback in Seoul last week. Reservations were expressed by a few countries, but what really mattered to South Block was the persistent opposition by ‘one country’ – China. This development has underlined the deep complexity and striking sensitivity of India-China relations.

After the post-Seoul introspection, New Delhi will no doubt draw appropriate lessons about NSG as well the issues and stakes that go beyond it.

On India’s membership of NSG, several countries (viz Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Austria, Switzerland, South Africa, New Zealand and Ireland) expressed themselves in favour of “a criteria-based process”. Turkey advocated linking the applications of India and Pakistan.

China, however, emphasized the importance of procedural aspects, hyphenated India with Pakistan, and insisted that only a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could enter NSG. This was contrary to the waiver NSG had granted to India in 2008. Recognising India’s solid non-proliferation record, NSG affirmed that its decision on India contributed to “the widest possible implementation of the provisions and objectives” of NPT. Fortunately, it was decided in Seoul “to continue” the discussion on participation of non-NPT states in the grouping, thereby leaving some hope for the future.

As keen observers of international politics point out, a significant trend has emerged in Western countries towards narrow nationalism, isolationist policies and withdrawal from regional or global platforms. The success of Trumpism and of Brexit in the referendum testifies to this. This tendency is gaining momentum when the global scene is marked by China’s rise, which is reflected in Beijing’s assertive policies and behavior.

For India, China has always been both an immediate neighbour and a major power. Given the tortuous history of bilateral relations, India and China have aptly been portrayed as neighbours, partners, competitors, rivals and antagonists. In contrast to the mid-20^th century, when the two nations were at about the same level of economic development, the asymmetry has now become apparently unbridgeable. In size, India’s economy is only 21 per cent of the Chinese economy today. Besides, China’s military expenditure was $215 billion in 2015, as compared to India’s $51 billion, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. These twin facts alone suggest the need for India to adopt a strategy of calibrated conciliation together with a focus on augmentation of its strength.

The Modi government has accorded high priority to managing and strengthening relations with China, thus continuing the previous line to broaden convergences and addressing divergences. Between the visit to India of President Xi Jinping in September 2014 and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with him in Tashkent on June 23, India’s president, external affairs minister, defense minister, NSA, foreign secretary and other dignitaries visited China. Besides, Xi Jinping and Modi met on numerous occasions at international summits. Clearly, if the relationship is still under stress today, it is not due to a lack of interaction at high diplomatic and political levels. It is because of a basic clash of perspectives and interests.

China perceives itself as the world’s second most powerful nation (after US), and as the dominant player in Asia. On the other hand, India, quite justifiably, projects itself as a major Asian power, imbued with the ambition to be a ‘leading power’ on the global stage. While the latter works for a multi-polar world, the former perhaps strives for a uni-polar Asia and a world in which only two powers matter – United States of America and China. The Chinese view India as a regional power and seem to suffer from geo-political angst as India-US relations grow.

The vexed India-China relationship will be moulded, in the coming years, by the changing dynamics within four power triangles. These are: China-India-US, China-India-Pakistan, China-India-Japan, and finally China-India-Russia. Of them, the first is of paramount importance. South Block needs to discover and secure just the right point of equilibrium on the US-China spectrum. It is also obliged to deepen relations with Japan and Russia, while maintaining as normal ties with Pakistan as possible. Our western neighbour is now known as China’s “iron brother.”

Divergences with China on a range of issues – border question, NSG, terrorism,  China’s South Asia policy, ‘One Belt, One Road (OBOR)’ initiative, South China Sea, India-US relations – need to be discussed and re-discussed at senior political levels, but away from media glare. The essential purpose should be to locate each other’s core interests as well as the specific areas where reconciliation is possible on the basis of a healthy give and take. For example, a serious dialogue on OBOR could be initiated, conveying clearly what may or may not be acceptable to India. Likewise, moderation and positive impulses on part of the media of the two countries should be encouraged. Another constructive suggestion is to motivate business leaders to contribute directly to enhancing mutual understanding and cooperation.

A clear lesson from the setback in Tashkent (where PM Modi’s direct request to Xi Jinping for support on the admission to NSG was rebuffed) is that negotiations should be conducted by others, not the highest political leaders. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping’s visit to attend the BRICS Summit in Goa in October offers a valuable opportunity to repair the relationship. The task to narrow differences should be handled at the preparatory stage – well before the summit gets underway.

In the absence of mutual understanding and accommodation between India and China, the projection of 21^st century as the ‘Asian century’ would sound hollow and meaningless. It is time for policy planners in Beijing and New Delhi to return to their drawing boards and plan afresh. Listening to sage counsel from outside the government domain could be a useful first step.