Whatever be the Bharatiya Janata Party’s fate in Bihar’s Assembly elections due next month, it has clearly snatched the pre-electoral baton from its main competition — Nitish Kumar and the Janata combine he leads.

BJP deserves credit for the way it cleverly and delicately managed to strike a balance between dissenting partners in the seat distribution and walk away with the lion’s share of seats itself. Before the seats were announced, all three allies bargained hard with the BJP as well as squabbled among each other. In the end, out of a total of 243 seats, BJP gave itself 160; Ram Vilas Paswan-led Lok Janshakti Party got 40, Upendra Kushwaha-led Rashtriya Lok Samata Party got 23, and Jitan Ram Manjhi-led Hindustani Awam Morcha got the remaining 20.

Significantly, BJP has made an arrangement with Manjhi, according to which five HAM candidates would contest from the BJP ticket. (If you’re wondering what exactly this means: congratulations for your attempt at a nuanced understanding of Bihar politics.) For the time being, it only means HAM will contest 15 seats.

But the LJP and RLSP were still disappointed that BJP was courting Manjhi more than what he was useful for. LJP scion Chirag Paswan said he was in a bit of a “shock” because of the discrepancy in what his party was promised and what they were given; Kushwaha said BJP needed to have a “badadil,” big heart. But the dissent was hushed. All four party heads came for a press conference, and smiled together.

BJP’s seat distribution, contrary to what its allies might allege, has been fair. To understand how this unnatural NDA coalition came about, a little background of the three leaders is necessary.

Ram Vilas Paswan has a reputation of going along with the prevailing hawa (air). In 2002, Paswan, who was the Union coal minister in the Vajpayee-led government, resigned protesting against the post-Godhra riots. Two years later he joined the UPA, and got the portfolio of minister of chemicals and fertilisers. His fate came to a standstill after he got zero seats in the 2009 Lok Sabha election and the 2010 Assembly election (in the latter he got three, but all three of his MLAs switched loyalty to Nitish). Paswan cried secularism till he joined the NDA a month before the Lok Sabha election took place last year.

Upendra Kushwaha was with Nitish, till they fell out in early 2013.

Kushwaha launched RLSP pledging to oust the then NDA coalition of JD(U) and BJP. A few months later the NDA in Bihar ousted itself. By 2014 Kushwaha was happy to swing alongside BJP: his party managed three seats in the general elections.

Manjhi’s case is the most interesting and tragic: Manjhi, who was one of Nitish’s most trusted lieutenants, was content being the minister for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes welfare in the JD(U)-BJP coalition. His elevation to chief ministership by Nitish last year was intended to be a safe, symbolic and short-term strategy. Manjhi’s attempt at a coup within JD(U) was unsuccessful, yet his removal from the party sullied Nitish’s image as that of an anti-Dalit leader. That the Narendra Modi-Amit Shah duo wanted to accommodate Manjhi at any cost had something to do with this.

If three BJP allies fight the election on their own, they will be reduced to being what they were two years ago: non-entities. BJP knows this only too well, and has played its card smartly by giving them together no more than a third of the total seats.

But the declaration of candidates — and the constituencies they would contest from — is equally crucial. Both Janata and NDA combines have been waiting for each other so they could respond by fielding the most appropriate candidates. In the Janata coalition, JD(U) and RJD are contesting on 100 seats each — less than what they were earlier used to. Both these parties have a strong base across the state, and might lose some of their promising candidates: they might contest independently or on a BJP ticket. While the BJP, with its fortunes increased is contesting on more seats than it previously did, there is discontent in the state unit because of the party’s emphasis on including younger faces and more non-upper caste candidates.

For the first time in Bihar, both the coalitions are “coalition of extremes”, neither can take a community’s support for granted. One wonders what the rural voters in Bihar — which is most of Bihar — are thinking. In the past it had been relatively easy for different caste groups to choose the least worst option. 2015 presents tougher choices.