It was meant to be a silent rally from Triplicane to Karunanidhi’s samadhi at the Marina beach in Chennai, a distance of 2 km, but all eyes were on the surround sound the crowd around MK Alagiri was attempting to create. After all, the numbers Karunanidhi’s elder son was able to gather to walk with him, were significant. Because they would decide if Alagiri the challenger would remain relevant in Tamil Nadu politics or walk away into the sunset.

Akin to a Kollywood potboiler, it was also about challenging younger brother MK Stalin on his turf. In the 1980s, fed up with the frequent wrangling between the siblings, Karunanidhi had sent away Alagiri to Madurai and asked him to look after southern Tamil Nadu for the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK). The northern part of the state was Stalin’s domain, with Chennai as the base. The rally therefore at a symbolic level, was meant to be Madurai’s attempt to trump Chennai.

In the end, the numbers were nowhere near the one lakh Alagiri had claimed would turn up. Independent estimates put the figure at around 7,000, with the more generous pegging it at over 10,000. More importantly, none of them were DMK cadre. The crowd included many outsiders who were happy to indulge in Chennai tourism.

In fact, Alagiri was in a Catch-22 situation. If the numbers had been impressive, questions would have been asked if he had received help from DMK’s rivals to organise the crowd. And if very few turned up, he would have been dismissed as a first ball duck in his comeback innings.

In cricketing parlance, Alagiri had everything going against him. The DMK wicket has proved to be unplayable, he has no team to speak of, he has been out of active politics for four years now and woefully out of match practice, and all the lead players are in Stalin’s team.

Alagiri’s revolt was a case of blow hot, blow cold. He attacked Stalin calling him incapable of leading the party to victory. He called him a working president who does not work. All this while claiming his father’s “true and loyal followers” were with him.

When the aggressive posturing failed to derive the desired result, Alagiri tried the soft approach. He sought his sister Selvi’s good offices to ensure a homecoming to the DMK. Alagiri who had once declared he won’t accept anyone but his father as his leader, agreed to work under Stalin’s leadership provided he was taken back into the party.

But despite Alagiri’s overtures, the DMK president is in no mood to turn the clock back. Stalin has clearly decided that Alagiri inside the DMK is a bigger threat than Alagiri outside the party.

Which is why action against Ravi, a DMK party functionary who greeted Alagiri at Chennai airport, was swift. He was immediately suspended from the party. Elsewhere, DMK activists tore Alagiri’s posters that were plastered all over Chennai. The intention was to ensure Alagiri saw the writing on the wall.

In fact, on August 31, just three days he assumed charge as DMK chief, Stalin admitted two leaders who had been earlier expelled by the DMK for indulging in anti-party activities. The messaging was meant for Alagiri, that anyone but him would be given a ghar waapsi.

Also by ensuring DMK spokespersons did not take part in any TV debates on the Alagiri issue, Stalin was sending the message that his brother was persona non grata as far the party was concerned. By refusing to take cognisance in the public domain, the DMK was trying to underline the irrelevance of Alagiri.

Is Stalin making a mistake by conveying that he cannot let bygones be bygones? His decision is based on what Alagiri brings to the table. Inducting him would create a rival power centre within the DMK, who would speak out of turn. During one of his birthday bashes when he was Chemicals minister in the UPA cabinet, his posters in Madurai announced him as `MK Alagiri, CM’. Technically, the reference was to his portfolio but the real expansion of the abbreviation was not lost on anyone.

Alagiri in the past has also enjoyed an unsavoury reputation, as a politician who indulged in use of both money and muscle power and in 2011, Jayalalithaa interpreted the DMK rout in southern Tamil Nadu as “people’s anger” against the “rowdy raj” of Alagiri and his men.

The most infamous incident in which his supporters were allegedly involved was the firebomb attack at the ‘Dinakaran’ Tamil newspaper office, killing three persons in 2007. They were upset that a survey on the political heir to Karunanidhi showed 70 per cent support to Stalin and just two per cent to Alagiri. In 2009, the byelection to Thirumangalam constituency saw the DMK under Alagiri’s stewardship reportedly paying Rs 5,000 per vote in order to ensure the party’s victory. This was subsequently called the ‘Thirumangalam formula’.

Would Alagiri’s Plan B be to play a spoiler? In 2001, after Alagiri was suspended by Karunanidhi for anti-party activities, he is believed to have ensured the defeat of DMK senior leader PTR Palanivel Rajan from Madurai West constituency. Rajan lost by 708 votes. But what gives the DMK confidence is that the Alagiri of 2018 is not the Alagiri of 2001.

Could Alagiri have played his cards better? Most certainly yes. His timing of attacking Stalin was wrong. If he was more crafty, he would have waited for Stalin to fail electorally. Now all of Tamil Nadu knows Alagiri has no more ammunition left.