US-India 2 + 2 = ?

With the COMCASA inked, India has demonstrated a willingness to discard the chastity belt it had worn for decades.

WrittenBy:Sushant Sareen
Date:
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The first 2+2 dialogue between India and the US has broken new ground between the two ‘natural allies’ and can legitimately be called (yet another) ‘defining moment’ (to use the words of the US Defence Secretary James Mattis) in their growing strategic relationship. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 2+2 was the signing of the second ‘foundational agreement’ – Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which is the India-specific version of the Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA).

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Although the COMCASA was somewhat underplayed in the Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the 2+2, the fact of the matter is that it catapults the defence and strategic relationship between India and the US to the next level. The US had been pressing India to sign on to COMCASA for long. But the Indian side had been resisting the agreement, partly out of irrational and somewhat ill-informed paranoia that the US will snoop on sensitive communications of the Indian Armed Forces, and partly out of a reluctance to get into too tight an embrace of a hegemonistic power like the US. As the old adage goes: “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.” But the holding out on COMCASA had set in motion diminishing returns because it seemed the Americans were running out of patience and were asking if India was serious about the strategic partnership. 
By biting the COMCASA bullet, the Indian government has not just signalled a tectonic shift in its strategic thinking, it has also demonstrated a willingness to start discarding the vital chastity belt that it had worn for decades using shibboleths like ‘strategic autonomy’. Even so, while India is stepping into a brave new world in which a major strategic realignment is taking place regionally and globally, it will require a complete reorientation of and readjustment in India’s strategic calculus and thinking if it wants to avoid being caught between two or more stools. 
Among the first things India needs to do is realise the limits of the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. A middle-level regional power that seeks to balance a major power on its border through partnerships with other major powers cannot lay claim to unbridled strategic autonomy. Even less so given India’s dependence on foreign powers not just for major weapon systems but also for technology and markets that are so critical for its economic growth and development. True, a country like India cannot completely cut itself away from other players in the region. But walking the tightrope between maintaining its relations with countries like Iran and Russia on the one hand, and on the other aligning itself more closely with a super-power like the US which has inimical relations with these countries, is going to become increasingly difficult.

For now, India will, however, need to draw a balance between geo-economics, geopolitics and geo-strategy. This is easier said than done. Iran and Russia have been, and to some extent still are, critical partners. But when stacked up against the US and its allies, they don’t really add to much, especially in geo-economic terms. India does hundreds of billions of dollars of trade with the US and its allies. But India’s trade with Iran is just around $14 billion (most of it oil that India imports). While Russia remains India’s largest weapons supplier, in recent years there have been serious problems in the relationship. In the realm of geopolitics, there is a growing divergence between India on the one hand and Iran and Russia on the other. Whether it is on Afghanistan and Taliban, or on other issues related to India’s security and strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific and rest of the Indian Ocean, there is a growing convergence between India and the US, while there is a divergence with Iran and Russia.

Even on the issue of terrorism, the US has done a lot more than any other country in addressing India’s concerns. From sanctioning Pakistan-based terrorist chiefs and organisations to sharing intelligence and information on terrorists, and from forcing Pakistan on to the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to pressuring Pakistan to clean up the terror swamps that function with impunity in that country, the US has done a lot. That these actions haven’t been very successful in ridding Pakistan of its addiction to jihadism is another matter. In fact, the US hasn’t been able to pressure Pakistan enough in its own cause, so for India to complain that the US hasn’t done enough for India doesn’t make too much sense. Of course, unless India expects that the US to bomb Pakistan into the stone age for its sake (not a bad idea, really), India needs to accept that there are limits to how far the US can or will go because it has other interests to protect.

And here lies a bit of the rub as far as convergence of interests between India and the US is concerned. While it’s a no-brainer that the China factor has pushed India and the US together, India needs to be clear that the interests of a global superpower and a regional power cannot ever converge fully. What is more, a strategic embrace of the US isn’t going to be all benign. It will demand a lot from India and will impact India’s relations with other countries, especially US adversaries. 
How India will defend its own interests (assuming that these can be defined with hard-headed clarity and not on the basis of historical and cultural links) when these conflict with US’ interests will be the great challenge for India’s diplomacy in the years ahead. Equally important, India must not harbour unrealistic expectations about what the US can or will do for it. The strategic embrace of the US is useful for the foreseeable future, but it isn’t forever because there is nothing permanent in relations between countries. India must, therefore, be clear on how it maximises this relationship in its own benefit and uses it to gain the ‘strategic autonomy’ that it craves for. 
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