Call it the Trump effect, or the steady crystallisation of concern over China’s assertiveness which is prompting a tentative, still inchoate, realignment in the Indo-Pacific, but China appears to be stepping back slightly. A recent visit to China was instructive not just in terms of getting an idea of the new apprehensions that are spooking the Chinese, but also the palpable keenness among Chinese scholars to not see India add to—or become part of—these emerging challenges, even threats, to China’s efforts to establish its political and economic hegemony in the region and beyond.

This doesn’t mean China is backing down or even reversing its plans. But China is speaking a lot more softly and is ostensibly trying to appear a lot more accommodative and understanding towards other countries than it has been for some time now. There was a concerted effort by Chinese interlocutors to explain themselves and project their policies as benign, constructive and cooperative. At the same time, they denied any sinister or conspiratorial designs to dominate the region and the world.

On relations with India, China appears to play down the Doklam crisis. They mention it but don’t give it too much salience. It’s almost as though they want to put it behind them for the foreseeable future, and not let it become a stumbling block in the bilateral relationship. Of course, this doesn’t mean that they have forgotten the issue. Nor does this mean that the matter has been settled for good. If anything, the Chinese seemed to have drawn lessons from the crisis. If reports in the media are anything to go by, they are now beefing up their logistics and other military requirements to ensure such a dare is not repeated.

But for now, given the sort of strategic realignments taking place, the Chinese would prefer to bide their time and not take any precipitate action that further complicates their strategic environment by pushing India into a more formal and structured grouping against China.

The starting point of all conversations with India is now the Wuhan spirit or Wuhan consensus. Most Chinese scholars were of the view that Wuhan had injected strategic stability in Sino-Indo relations, and that while Modi and Xi seemed to be moving ahead, scholars and analysts in both countries did not appear to be keeping pace with them. The focus is on exploring avenues for enhancing cooperation. The trade war with the US and the Trump administration’s aggressive strategic moves—including the Indo-Pacific strategy and the talk of Quad—is clearly having its impact on China’s policy on India.

But this change in China is probably more tactical than strategic. The change in Chinese attitude is also not just with India but also with other countries. The challenge for all these countries will be how to use this opportunity to restore strategic balance in the region. In other words, it’s a classic game theory problem. Each individual country will try to maximise its benefit which, in fact, suits the Chinese who can play one against the other and prevent a collective approach. But if the regional countries were to coordinate their approach, they might all be better off, both individually as well as collectively.

In India’s case, China seems to be putting a lot of emphasis on the need for both countries to work together on global trade issues and in favour of globalisation. There is greater openness in China to try and sort out some of the economic issues that are bedevilling relations between the two countries. The bottom-line is that China doesn’t want to see India enter into any formal or informal alliance with the US. There was a lot of  inquisitiveness about the COMCASA agreement and India’s strategic perceptions about the Indo-Pacific. Ironically, even as the Chinese scholars were emphatic in their rejection of unilateralism, this was limited to US unilateralism and didn’t include Chinese unilateralism in the South China Sea.

One striking impression that emerged was that while China was very forthcoming, even positive, on cooperating with India on regional issues, it seemed detached and disinterested when Indian delegates spoke about extra-regional issues—Africa or Latin America or even global politico-strategic issues. It was as though China felt its engagement with India was limited to South Asia and dissuading it from doing anything that caused discomfort to China in Southeast and East Asia. Beyond this region, India had no role to play in China’s calculus.

China also emphatically debunked any suggestion of encircling India. It seemed to avoid discussions on either Sri Lanka or Maldives where news reports suggest a contest for influence between India and China. Within the region, it sidestepped Indian concerns over its alliance with Pakistan, and gave the stock responses on CPEC which don’t really convince anyone since they fly in the face of facts on the ground. Since CPEC is part of BRI and everyone in China sings from the same sheet when it comes to President Xi Jinping’s pet project, a lot of effort was made to dispel the rising doubts that the entire scheme is part of China’s debt-trap diplomacy. But here again, the Chinese weren’t convincing because the money’s involved and the scope and structure of the BRI projects run counter to the spin that Chinese scholars are trying to give.

On terrorism, once again there was the usual Chinese stonewalling. They were not forthcoming on either the Jaish-e-Mohammad issue or any other terrorism-related issue which involved Pakistan. At the same time, they parroted the standard line about the need to cooperate to fight terrorism. Quite clearly, there is as yet no rethink on either CPEC or lowering relationship with all-weather friend.

On trade issues, the Shanghai expo was projected as the sign of change in the Chinese economic thinking and the opening up of the Chinese economy to other countries. According to one Chinese scholar, there is a tectonic shift taking place in the Chinese economic structure which will open up opportunities for other countries and help address some of the trade-related issues. The emerging trends are that China was entering the post-industrial phase and the shares of services sector was going up. Alongside, China was now entering the consumption era. Both these trends are responsible for the third trend which is that China would need to import more from the rest of the world to meet the needs of its people.

In the case of India, one example was given of the zero tariff regime on cancer medicines which, according to the Chinese, was a step in the direction of opening up the pharmaceutical and other sectors to Indian exporters. There were complaints about the restrictive visa regimes and suggestions to promote greater people-to-people contacts. Tourism was seen as a new and important sector that needed to be promoted.

The thing about China is that what you hear in the first meeting is what you hear in all other meetings—almost as if everything is reading from a prepared script. The singularity of message is both peculiar and boring. But what is important is that it leaves no room for any ambiguity or confusion on the policy of the party and the state. Even so, unlike psychotic and perfidious countries like Pakistan who say something and do something totally opposite, dealing with China is what diplomacy is all about.

China is undoubtedly a difficult neighbour and a strategic challenge for India, but not because it is abnormal or neurotic. If anything, in terms of great power ambitions and strategy, China is no different from any other country which amassed the sort of economic heft, diplomatic influence and military strength which it possesses. These factors make it more difficult for India to negotiate with China. But if India makes use of the opportunities that exist and will present themselves in the future, it will find that dealing with China a lot easier, even fruitful, that dealing with many other countries which hang on to the coat-tails of the Chinese to remain relevant.