The atrocity committed by the Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Pulwama has sparked massive outrage throughout India. The government is under tremendous public and political pressure to give a punishing response to the perpetrators, plotters and facilitators of the suicide bombing in Pulwama.

Whether anyone likes it or not, there is also an electoral compulsion for the governing party to not let the Pakistanis get away with this latest act of mass murder. But even from the point of view of national security, it is now imperative for the government to not just react, but also be seen to be reacting. In other words, some action is inevitable and this action will probably be more visible than the ‘surgical strikes’ of 2016. This might not appeal to the turn-the-other-cheek liberal, but this crowd doesn’t count. There will be both kinetic and non-kinetic steps that will be available in the menu of options before the government.

Needless to say, the government’s action cycle will not be based on the 24-hour news cycle of TV stations. The retaliation will not be knee-jerk but cold, calculated, calibrated and to the extent possible, clinical. But retaliation in itself won’t be enough because India now needs to move beyond the action-reaction cycle to a more solid and robust policy-oriented approach that uses all elements of national power and adopts an all-of-government approach to fix the terror factory that is Pakistan.

The BJP-led NDA government has lost valuable time – four and a half years – in forging such a policy and putting in place a series of measures that no subsequent government will be able to change easily. But some of the steps it has taken in the aftermath of the Pulwama attack won’t be easy for any government to overturn.

Even as the government considers the kinetic options, it has already initiated the first few non-kinetic options, which are no less, and in some ways more important than the kinetic options. While the military action satisfies the quest for revenge which is important not just for national morale but also for political credibility, it is the non-military options that will lay down the policy-oriented approach which will be more enduring. It is, of course, a no-brainer that both the kinetic and non-kinetic options are exercised not just across the border but also internally in Jammu and Kashmir, and if the first indications are anything to go by, this is precisely what is happening.

Internally, the crackdown that commenced after the Pulwama bombing needs to be intensified. The suicide attack has given justification, if ever it was needed, to take the gloves off and start dismantling the ecosystem that nurtures and supports terrorism. The withdrawal of security (which also means denial of a protocol) is an excellent first step.

But alongside, the financial system that sustains the terrorists and separatists also needs to be taken down. Many of these separatists are nothing but conflict entrepreneurs who have made fancy fortunes and fabulous assets through illegitimate means. Many of them have built shopping plazas and malls illegally and these need to be brought down. They need to be reduced to penury and made an example of so that it is clear that crime and terrorism won’t pay. This is also a great time to cleanse the administration at all levels of sympathisers and supporters of separatism and rewarding people who believe in the idea of India. But most importantly, the security forces and the government will need to come down hard on the agent provocateurs who mobilise stone-pelting mobs. This also means detoxifying the education system which has been infiltrated by Islamists.

On Pakistan, there is a menu of diplomatic, economic and political options. The withdrawal of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status and an imposition of a 200 per cent import duty on Pakistani products is an excellent first step. It might have gone over the heads of the Aam Aadmi-types like Vishal Dadlani but this is how punitive trade measures work, and these are fairly effective. No, they are not a magic bullet, but they hurt the already on-the-ropes Pakistani economy. The import duties virtually kill all Pakistani exports to India. If the Pakistanis retaliate on Indian exports, they will only harm their own industry, especially their only real industry – cotton and textiles – which constitutes around 60 per cent of their exports worldwide.

Pakistan buys cotton from India which then runs its industry. We could ban the export of cotton from India, which would raise the price of their products and make them even more uncompetitive. At a time when core inflation is going up in Pakistan, if they now have to import fruit and vegetables from anywhere other than India, there will be a cost involved which will impose a penalty on the people, who incidentally are not our friends but in fact support the demonic policies of their state and deep state.

But MFN and direct trade is only one prong of the attack. India can easily undercut Pakistani exports, most of which are also part of the Indian export basket. Alongside, India needs to now start putting in place a system of selective sanctions against countries and companies doing business in Pakistan. Let us leverage our economic heft and market strategically.

The ‘with us or against us’ dictum can be used selectively to deny market access to companies dealing with or investing in Pakistan. Extend this also to countries like China, which has unashamedly backed and protected a terrorist like Masood Azhar. The Chinese should be told there will be consequences of their hypocrisy and support to terrorists. Initially, we could withdraw contracts to some Chinese companies, and deny access to others. This can be calibrated as we go along to divert trade from China to other countries. At the political and strategic level, some of the caution India has shown on issues like the Quad needs to change. India can move firmly into the Quad camp and become part of a broader alliance that is aimed at containing China so that the Chinese realise the strategic loss of supporting a third-rate Pakistani terrorist.

India has been negligent in using its position in international financial institutions for advancing its strategic goals. For instance, India has a 2.7 per cent vote in the IMF. This is certainly not enough to exercise a veto but can be used as a bargaining chip with other countries to either oppose an IMF bailout package to Pakistan or else ensure that very hard conditions are imposed that will emasculate the Pakistan economy. Ditto in the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and other international financial institutions. India has for far too long played the gentleman’s game, and it is about time that they now take off the gloves, throw antiquated notions of chivalry in the dustbin, and accept the fact that if you have to fight the pig, you will have to be prepared to get dirty.

We should also be prepared that we will not win all these battles and in fact might lose many of them. But that shouldn’t change our stance or our strategy because if we keep pushing relentlessly in forums like FATF and other multilateral financial and political institutions, eventually we will taste success.

Related to the economic offensive, there is the diplomatic offensive. It is all very well to explain our case to other countries but let us not be fooled by the pro forma condemnation being issued by most of these countries. These pious statements, even if they name and shame Pakistan and the terrorist groups based in that country, are pretty much useless as they are water off a duck’s back as far as Pakistan is concerned.

Our neighbour from hell has no shame left and will brazen it out, as indeed they are doing. We should make it very clear that anyone who condemns this attack needs to put their money where their mouth is.

In other words, there have to be punitive measures taken against Pakistan if they are genuine and sincere in their condemning the attack. In any case, it is utterly facile to expect that other countries will take any strong steps against Pakistan unless there is a price attached to not taking such steps. What the government needs to think of seriously is what this price is and how it can be imposed.

Finally, while it is a given that the government will use some sort of kinetic action, and it is likely to be visible action, it is important that they game the entire scenario and prepare for next steps. Pakistan could either lump the kinetic action (like they did on ‘surgical strikes’) or be forced to respond. If they react then India will be forced to go up the escalation ladder. This will then have to be a decision that is taken based on Pakistani capabilities and compulsions (including the fact that the Pakistani state is on the verge of bankruptcy), and calculations.

The Pakistani calculus will be that once the two countries climb a few steps up the escalation ladder, and the Pakistanis indulge in some nuclear sabre-rattling, international intervention will be inevitable. They would be calculating that once this happens there will be pressure on both countries to enter into a dialogue, either at a bilateral level or through third-party mediation. Needless to say, the Pakistanis will try to plug Kashmir into this. At that stage, India will need to tell everyone where they get off. We will need to stall and stonewall the busybodies in the international community who are ever ready to intervene but never ready to stop Pakistan from exporting terrorism. India will need to be ready to impress and press its interlocutors that the only issue to be discussed is dismantling the jihad factory in Pakistan.

The Pakistanis will, of course, drumbeat the UN resolutions, but India now needs to make it clear that these resolutions are totally infructuous because Pakistan reneged on them by not withdrawing its forces and people from parts of Jammu and Kashmir it had occupied.

The moment of truth is now once again upon India. Not responding is not an option. But the response has to transcend revenge and become a strategic response for it to have any real meaning. Giving a bloody nose to Pakistan will, of course, be very satisfying, but what will be even more useful is paralysing the Pakistani body. The former is a short-term, tactical palliative, and the latter is the Kautilyan thing to do.