These are interesting times. By the time the spring of Pakistan-backed jihadi terror attacks and Indo-Pak conflict makes way for the scorching summer of the Lok Sabha battle, Narendra Modi will no longer be wrestling with the dilemma of whether to act as the Prime Minister or a Prime Minister seeking re-election. By then, more clarity is expected on the degree to which the cultural appeal of the nation as an imagined community—to use political scientist Benedict Anderson’s phrase—would work as the electoral constituency for the incumbent and his challengers.

Armed confrontation with a hostile neighbour who uses terror as an instrument of state policy is inevitably a rallying point in competitive claims on national security. In times of conflict, this can be true for any age or country. However, it becomes even more important in times when the nation-state is believed to have regained its centrality.

This comeback of the nation-state—having its moorings in the nature of international order that emerged in the 19th century—has belied many predictions of its disappearance in the last few decades of the 20th century. Such premature obituaries of nationalism, as seen in writings of scholars like Francis Fukuyama (“defanged” is what he calls it in his famous 1989 essay “End of History”), had only to wait for a few years to eat their words. Someone had already foreseen that such predictions were quite naive. In an essay for the bimonthly journal Foreign Affairs, which earlier this month had a special issue on New Nationalism, historian Jill Nepore remembers what Stanford historian Carl Degler had said in 1986. Degler was perceptively critical of his colleagues for abandoning the study of the nation.

“We can write history that implicitly denies or ignores the nation-state, but it would be a history that flew in the face of what people who live in a nation-state require and demand,” Degler said. He went on to identify the perils of such neglect, as he observed: “If we historians fail to provide a nationally defined history, others less informed will take over the job for us.”

This isn’t only a useful perspective for contemporary historians to consider but is equally important for media commentary and political analysis.

With varying degrees of impact at different points of time, the fact remains that the pull of nationalism continues to be the abstract driver of popular imagination of the political agency. In a way, it reminds one that cohesive non-tangibles of social contract in a political society can’t be dismissed for prioritising the tangibles.

In what seems to be a longer phase of conflict awaiting India in the event of a Pakistani retaliation, the way national security questions will unfold in electoral fortunes is still uncertain. A few factors can be important here to see.

First, there is no precedent of a Lok Sabha polls so closely preceded by armed conflict, or in the midst of it. All wars with Pakistan have been fought by governments which were either in the middle of their tenures or in their initial phase. That includes the Chinese invasion of 1962,  the inconclusive 1965 Pakistan war and the resounding victory in 197, and the Kargil war of 1999. So an empirical lens—if at all a guide—is of little help to know the impact of a conflict-inspired nationalist solidarity.

Second, the next few weeks may determine the line the Opposition will take in walking the tightrope of being the contesting voices in matters facing the country’s security. It needs calibration of narratives in a way that it doesn’t come across as obstructionist. They will need to be careful about not making noises that sound like jarring notes when the chorus of unity against a common enemy is expected. It’s in this context that we can see the early congratulatory messages of Opposition leaders after the Balkot air strike by Indian Air Force, ranging from Congress president Rahul Gandhi to West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee.

This becomes more important given Prime Minister Modi’s advantage in having the image of a decisive and combative defender of the country’s security interests. Being at the helm of affairs and setting India’s response agenda may add to Modi’s edge while making him vulnerable to a boomerang if the government is perceived to be mishandling the response.

Third, the altered poll script will require the Opposition to time their attack on the government more strategically. This sense of timing will shape the campaign discourse. The ways in which the Opposition rallies behind security forces while articulating themselves as better alternatives for national security leadership.

Fourth, in the event of de-escalation of border tensions, the immediacy of the security challenge may settle down to the normalcy of other electoral issues, including anti-incumbency. That would need a refocusing of strategies of both the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance and the Congress-led Opposition. Both wouldn’t want to be caught napping when the conflict situation dissipates, the news cycle has its run, and security anxieties calm down.

With clouds of cross border conflict hovering over the Lok Sabha elections, the contours of the poll campaign have become hazy. In many ways, it reasserts the primacy of the immediacy in political contests. That immediacy, for the next few weeks, is the rival claims on the leadership of national security. That, however, doesn’t preclude more weeks to follow.