It’s been 25 years since Nitish Kumar’s capacity for decision-making, as well as tactical indecision, had its first significant political moment when he left Chajju Bagh and mounted the Chetna Rally stage at Gandhi Maidan in Patna. That February 1994 rally marked his parting of the ways with Lalu Prasad Yadav, and Janata Dal by extension, to carve his own identity in Bihar’s fluid post-Mandal politics. In a very different political setting of 2019, that capacity of his would be tested over next the 17 months as battle lines would be drawn for November 2020 Assembly polls in the state.

With various factors and dynamics waiting to unfold, any conjecture about his moves, and for that matter that of his party Janata Dal-United (JD(U)), is fraught with risk. The recent signs of unease with his National Democratic Alliance (NDA) ally, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), might not tell the whole exercise of stocktaking that Nitish would be preoccupied with in the run-up to the polls. Similar assessment from the BJP and the electorally bruised, and currently his party’s desperate suitor, Rashtriya Janata Party (RJD) would also play a role in the political chessboard that would be laid out for the November 2020 polls.

There could be different reasons for Nitish asking for proportionate representation of JD(U) MPs in the Narendra Modi-led NDA government at the Centre, and staying away from it when only one berth was offered. The obvious one is his unwillingness to come to terms with the changed scenario of a dominant BJP in the NDA formation at the Centre—quite unlike the earlier NDA governments led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee where a slim majority afforded more elbow room to allies like JD(U) in berth allocation. Having himself worked as a minister in NDA governments formed in the late 90s, the point of departure from an alliance-dependent government has unleashed its own set of insecurities in regional party leaders like Nitish.  On its part, the BJP, conscious of the vagaries of electoral politics, is keen on accommodating allies in the central government but not beyond a point. To put it differently, not letting them punch them above their weight. That’s where the difference in perception matters.

There is a sense in the BJP that it gave generous concessions to the JD(U) in seat sharing and 17-17-6 formula for BJP-JD(U)-LJP (Lok Janshakti Party) benefitted the JD(U) and the LJP more as they won many seats riding on Modi’s popularity wave. In fact, the BJP had let go of the five seats it had won in 2014 (when its tally in the state was 23) to accommodate allies. Post-results, there is a perception that similar concessions can’t be given in ministerial-berth allocation.  

What, however, could have been a far more practical difficulty for Nitish in accepting the offer for only one berth is that it could have left hopefuls from different caste groups disgruntled. Given that his close aide RCP Singh was almost certain as one of the claimants, no room for accommodating other claimants could have unleashed a fresh round of discontent in the JD(U). That’s something Nitish can’t afford in the penultimate year before state elections.

Retaining and expanding the social base among voters is something that both the JD(U) and the BJP would prioritise—sometimes allying as well as competing. After the 2005 victory in Assembly polls, JD(U) had worked on building a social coalition of core support which included: non-Yadav OBCs (especially Kurmis and Koeris), Mahadalits (which excluded the relatively well-off Dusads among Dalits), Economically Backward Class, a section of Muslims, along with cultivating few influential leaders among upper castes. Aided by Nitish government’s impressive record on governance and chief minister’s personal reputation for probity and development, the 2010 Assembly polls were smooth sailing for the NDA. However, following its dissociation with the NDA in 2013, the JD( U) found it hard to keep that social coalition intact and even lost the share of upper caste BJP votes that it was taking for granted as part of the NDA. It was reduced to two seats in the 2014 LS polls, before bouncing back with 71 seats in the 2015 polls as part of the Mahagatbandhan with the RJD and Congress. In 2017, it parted ways with the Mahagatbandhan to rejoin the NDA and run a simple majority government.

However, Nitish has reasons to be anxious about the party’s hold among support groups. Statistics may not tell the story. In fact, they point towards JD(U)’s rising vote share in the 2019 LS polls. The JD(U) witnessed its vote share rising to 21.8 per cent this time from 16.04 per cent in 2014, when it had contested alone on all 40 seats. On the other hand, its ally, the BJP, got 23.58 per cent of the total votes polled, which is lower than 29.40 per cent it got in the 2014 polls. While this difference might give a sense that the BJP made concessions to let its ally grow at its own expense, the worry for the JD(U) is no less. That is rooted in a common understanding that the JD(U) rode on Prime Minister Modi’s popularity to gain this impressive rise in the party’s vote share. The rise might not be a fair measure of its hold among its voter base.

Such anxiety could be real or imagined. In the last few years, the Prohibition policy and other policy initiatives have helped Nitish gain popularity among women voters—that’s a gain across castes and sections. Another aspect is that the conventional calculation of an alliance with the BJP would show the cost of a decline in the JD(U)’s share of the Muslim vote. However, in recent the LS polls, victories in Seemanchal constituencies like Araria and Katihar—having a high concentration of Muslim population—haven’t been in sync with such assessment. The JD(U) is also aware that even in 2005 and 2010, despite having an alliance with the BJP, Muslims voted for it in large numbers.

There is a strong perception that Nitish’s problems with the BJP aren’t about its state unit. It has more to do with Modi’s dominant position and the possibility of the Modi-Shah duo pushing the BJP to play Big Brother in the state. That might be the case, but there are reasons for the party to be threatened by the BJP’s expanding support among a section of backward castes as well as Dalits—the non-core part of the BJP’s support base in the state. While conceding electorally to allies in seat-sharing, the BJP hasn’t stopped eyeing greater social reach and expanding its social coalition. If that happens, that will come at the cost of its rival as well as allying parties like the JD(U). An ambitious national party shouldn’t be expected to be dependent on regional allies in the longer run.

Talking strictly in immediate terms, a weak RJD isn’t an attractive proposition for Nitish now—perhaps as tricky as a strong Modi. The RJD-led Mahagatbandhan was 28 per cent behind the NDA in vote share in the recent LS polls. It could get only 25 per cent votes against the NDA’s 53 per cent. It is relevant to remember here that the RJD’s core voters—the Muslim-Yadav combine—alone constitute 30 per cent of the electorate. That gives a sense that the Mahagatbandhan couldn’t even get core votes.

In a comparative frame, in the 2015 Assembly polls, despite the loss, the NDA’s vote share was only 7 per cent behind Mahagatbandhan’s.

For the time being, Nitish can’t be indifferent to those numbers while considering any response to the RJD’s feelers for any realignments. One likely realignment he might consider could be with Jitan Ram Manjhi’s Hindustani Awam Morcha (HAM). With minimal costs to incur, such realignment could help Nitish consolidate his Mahadalit vote base—a section in which Manjhi has considerable appeal. Before deciding the alliance he would like to contest the 2020 polls with, Nitish could be expected to secure Manjhi’s support in his kitty.

There is very little chance of the JD(U) going solo. The simple reason behind that is its inability to mobilise a cadre despite being in government for 14 years now. Its electoral campaigns have piggybacked on alliance partner’s cadre—either the BJP or the RJD (as in 2015). In fact, the BJP and the RJD are the only parties in Bihar with a strong cadre presence—a fact that could have an important bearing on any decision to go solo. However, the option of avoiding a pre-poll alliance gives the party the elbow room to craft a post-poll alliance based on eventual numbers.

Seventeen months is a long period in politics, particularly for someone with a pragmatic reputation like Nitish. The outcomes of some key state polls in Haryana, Maharashtra and Delhi also await him in the intervening period. Those, however, would be only one of the many factors that would shape his electoral strategy for the 2020 polls. In tracking and assessing his moves, the roadmap and externalities of other key players in the state—the BJP and RJD—shouldn’t be lost sight of. The coming months would be interesting, for seeing what clues Patliputra is giving for the next claimant of 1, Anne Marg.