Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping spent last weekend in the coastal town of Mamallapuram, Tamil Nadu, and a beach-facing resort with much fanfare and South Indian food. They exchanged gifts, held hands aloft, and had six hours of what Xi referred to as “candid conversations as friends and heart-to-heart discussions on bilateral ties”. 

The two leaders ensured that ongoing disagreements, particularly over the Kashmir issue, did not spill over during their October 11-12 summit. Instead, they focussed on matters of strategic cooperation, ranging from terrorism to trade. Modi called it a new era in the Indo-China relationship and wrapped it up by accepting an invitation for the third edition of the informal summit in China next year. Then, Modi left for campaigning in Maharashtra and Xi left for Kathmandu, bearing investments for transit and defence projects for Nepal. 

Beyond the scenic photo-ops and new measures announced by the two countries, there wasn’t a major shift in the contentious aspects of the India-China relationship, rooted in the Indo-Pacific region and shaped by international actors. These include a six-decade-old boundary dispute, the increasing influence of China through its Belt and Road Initiative, development assistance for neighbouring Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and the “all-weather” friendship with Pakistan. Adding to that is the growing American pressure on New Delhi to keep Huawei out of the deployment of 5G spectrum (experts say India must decide on its own based on its national interest and security implications). 

The run-up to last weekend’s second informal summit — now called the “Chennai Connect” — was overshadowed by China’s support to Pakistan in internationalising the Kashmir dispute. And several other disruptions had risen following the inaugural informal summit at Wuhan last April, such as China opposing India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and calling for closed consultations at the United Nations Security Council for an informal outcome on India’s moves in Kashmir.

Xi arrived in Chennai close on the heels of Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing and China’s announcement that it was keeping a close watch on Kashmir. India responded by reiterating that the abrogation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status was an internal affair. All this happened just hours after India and China had made simultaneous announcements about Xi’s visit two days before the summit. These developments were unlike at the Wuhan summit, where both nations had been careful in communicating sensitive topics, coming as it had in the backdrop of the military standoff at Doklam. Despite Kashmir overshadowing the Chennai meet, it was not raised. But Xi briefed Modi about Khan’s visit, Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said at a post-summit press conference. 

“China is unlikely to budge and will continue to do everything for Pakistan without giving Indian sentiments their due. This not just serves their own interests but also provides China a way of showing India its place,” says Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan, distinguished fellow and head of the nuclear and space policy initiative, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. “What I see India doing pragmatically is that while it engages with China, it is clear in building ties with others in the Indo-Pacific to balance China.”

According to Rajagopalan, this is most evident from the upgradation of quadrilateral engagements to ministerial level dialogues in order to counter China. The Quad comprises India, the US, Japan and Australia. “That’s how Indian foreign policy must be,” she says. “Even in the case of Pakistan, we must engage with similar compulsions.”  

Rajagopalan adds that India must continue to nurture its trilateral and minilateral strategic ties with Japan, the US, Australia and Indonesia — countries which share its concerns about a rising China. 

While informal summitry improves the atmospherics for political leaders, it does little to address pressing issues, say foreign policy experts. “China is our number one adversary whether we like it or not,” says RS Vasan, director of the Centre for Chinese Studies in Chennai. “While there is no traction on outstanding issues, we have to look at making the best after Mamallapuram — make sure differences do not lead to disputes, look at areas of cooperation and mutual respect. We shouldn’t aim to stop China’s penetration in South Asia but try to manage it. There is a phenomenal amount of money China pumped into Nepal and we cannot match that. We need more investments and while China moves away from the US, we have to be able to take a big share of the pie.”

A key takeaway from the meeting is that China has agreed to tackle India’s trade imbalance which is currently skewed in China’s favour. The two countries will establish a high-level economic and trade dialogue mechanism to be headed by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and China’s Vice Premier Hu Chunhua. China is India’s largest trading partner while India is its 11th largest (India racked up its highest trade deficit of $53 billion in 2018-19). 

India is expected to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership — a 16-nation regional free trade agreement — which it has been reluctant to so far because of domestic concerns that there could be an influx of cheaper Chinese imports. Modi specifically conveyed to Xi that a balance should be maintained between trade and goods, services and investment. 

“For the last several years, the EU, EU member states, the US and Australia have all been complaining about the huge trade deficit they have been having with China but change will happen only if China thinks it needs to be done. And recent history doesn’t suggest they would take active measures to please other nations,” says KC Sundaram, director of the Indian Institute of Public Policy. “There’s no comparison between China and India when it comes to playing a strong role in foreign policy and influence across all continents. China is a far bigger player in the EU, Africa, Australia, Asia, in the Caucasus and also in Russia, a long-time close ally of India. India’s foreign policy under Modi has been reinvigorated and is now playing a more active role in Africa, but India does realise it cannot seriously compete with China.”

Even as India partners with the US and the Quad to counter China’s rise, especially its assertion in the South China Sea, former diplomat Ashok Sajjanhar says New Delhi has to maintain “civility and stability” with Beijing to be able to handle the bilateral issues of the border, Pakistan and Tibet. “Post Wuhan, the idea was to reset strategic communications between militaries so that another Doklam doesn’t occur and it worked,” says Sajjanhar, who served in Washington when India and the US signed the nuclear deal in 2005. “Expectations were limited for the Mamallapuram summit which looked into bringing some predictability into the relationship following the Kashmir move — in which India is confident in its position and it prevails. It shows that China is willing to listen to India’s concerns and the fact that another informal summit has been planned shows that both sides realise utility in it.”