The recent visit of Afghanistan’s acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to India marked another step in New Delhi’s gradual recalibration of ties with the Taliban leadership in Kabul. This aligns with how India has been reassessing its terms of engagement with the Taliban even before the militia regained power in 2021.

India’s latest decision to upgrade its Technical Mission in Kabul to a full-fledged embassy isn’t exactly a turnaround for those who have followed the subtle diplomatic signalling of the past few years. Even if India hasn’t formally recognised the Taliban government, the reset is visible. More significantly, the move reflects how India views its vital security interests and its desire to enhance influence in its western neighbourhood.

By the end of the last decade, New Delhi had come to terms with the necessity of acknowledging the Taliban as a geopolitical player, not merely a militia. In later years, as US troops prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan and the UN-Taliban deal took shape at the Doha meet, India felt compelled to attend – if only to ensure its security concerns weren’t brushed aside, especially with Pakistan playing a central role in the negotiations. That, however, meant formally sharing the conference table with Taliban representatives. Informally, there was precedent.

A reluctant recognition

In 2018, with signs of a US-Taliban deal becoming inevitable, India sent two diplomats – Amar Sinha, former envoy to Afghanistan, and T C A Raghavan, former high commissioner to Pakistan – to an international conference in Moscow on the Afghanistan peace process, attended by a Taliban delegation.

In February 2020, India’s envoy to Qatar, P Kumaran, attended the US-Taliban peace deal signing ceremony in Doha at the invitation of the Qatari government. Even as an observer, it was India’s first official presence at an international event that included Taliban representatives. However, even this participation was carefully preceded by a visit from foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla to Kabul – to underline that India still valued the then-legitimate Afghan government headed by President Ashraf Ghani. But in 2021, the terms of legitimacy changed dramatically after the Taliban seized power in Kabul.

Now, with India’s external affairs minister comfortably seen shaking hands with his counterpart in the Taliban regime, the cost-benefit calculations come to the fore. There are clear gains New Delhi would be eyeing – as well as risks that still demand caution.

It’s evident that New Delhi has taken a pragmatic view of the fact that the Taliban is the de facto power governing a key country in its western neighbourhood. It hasn’t tied itself to the India-US 2+2 joint statement of 2023, which had urged the Taliban to uphold human rights norms. India knows that Western capitals like Washington rarely allow human rights concerns to come in the way of strategic interests – whether in the oil-rich Gulf or among other allies. So, India’s diplomatic signalling to Kabul sidestepped moral rhetoric and identified a strategic opening. 

This clear-eyed realism took time to develop, as former diplomat Vivek Katju has noted.

Shared interests, shifting ground

The mutuality of interests between Kabul and New Delhi now carries the added weight of timing. 

First, the Taliban sees immense value in retaining India’s continued support in infrastructure building – roads, schools, dams, hospitals, and training in higher education and professional skill development. India, meanwhile, enjoys enormous goodwill in Afghanistan for its role in post-earthquake reconstruction. Kabul is also seeking Indian investments in mining and water resource management – sectors that would otherwise attract Beijing and Islamabad. In doing so, Kabul appears eager to build a broader support system for its economy rather than becoming another vassal state for China.

Second, widening differences between Kabul and Islamabad – now escalating into open hostility – present India with an opportunity to build ties on common ground. Border skirmishes and Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan have already provoked the Taliban regime to tell Islamabad to “stop playing games”.

Once seen as a strategic instrument of Pakistan’s military establishment, the Taliban has resisted Islamabad’s meddling in its foreign policy, including Kabul’s India policy. Pakistan also seems to have miscalculated its influence over the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which the Afghan Taliban has refused to rein in for Islamabad’s benefit. Acknowledging Kabul’s growing border troubles, India’s external affairs minister recently said both India and Afghanistan face a “shared threat of cross-border terrorism.” That common ground is increasingly visible – including in Kabul’s reaction after the Pahalgam terror attack.

Third, India’s long-standing quest for an alternative trade route to West Asia – bypassing Pakistan – has always involved improving ties with Afghanistan. This has become even more significant after years of investment in Iranian port facilities. Kabul’s renewed border sensitivities may increase the need for alternative trade routes – a scenario New Delhi would welcome, given the potential for a geopolitical realignment.

However, India’s engagement comes with necessary caution. One concern is how long and deep the Taliban’s rift with Islamabad will last. Another is the potential for Pakistan or even China to eventually co-opt the Taliban regime. These uncertainties give the equation a degree of volatility – though that’s true of most scenarios in the region’s geopolitics.

For now, India continues to stop short of formally recognising the Taliban government. Even with the reopening of its embassy in Kabul, New Delhi will likely appoint only a chargé d’affaires rather than an ambassador. Formal recognition may come eventually, but India appears to be waiting for a broader international consensus. Among major powers, Russia has already recognised the Taliban regime, but New Delhi is wary of reinforcing perceptions in Washington that it is aligning with Moscow’s view on the Afghan question. Having already asserted strategic autonomy over Russian oil imports, India sees no need to add fuel to that narrative. It can secure its interests with Kabul quietly, without fanfare.

In a possible sign of shifting sands of geopolitics in the region, Afghanistan – once seen as providing “strategic depth” to Islamabad in India’s western neighbourhood – now offers New Delhi a window for security leverage. By building bilateral heft with Kabul, India hopes not only to offset Pakistan’s former advantage but also to use the Afghan route for trade with West Asia.

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