A recent order of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) approved a plan requiring media baron Subhash Chandra to pay Rs 6.25 crore against guarantees of over Rs 22,000 crore. The order has since been stayed but it brought a larger question into focus: when thousands of crores of public money are at stake, how much scrutiny do decisions in India’s bankruptcy system really face? And how much scope do courts and tribunals have to question decisions taken by creditors.

Against this backdrop, Newslaundry looked at the biggest player in this system: the Adani Group, with a robust winning record in insolvency bids. In fact, the group has emerged as the largest corporate acquirer through India’s insolvency process by both the number and size of acquisitions.

Since 2018, Adani Group, its linked entities and consortiums have participated in bids to acquire 26**  distressed companies through India’s bankruptcy process. It has won 16 of them, with one case ongoing, though the latest decision went in Adani’s favour. This is a 61.5 percent success rate – meaning it won nearly three out of every five bids. While 14 of these 16 acquisitions came through the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) to revive distressed business, the other two came through liquidation aimed at winding up operations.

Newslaundry examined the public records of 13 of the 16 of the companies the group won. These included power plants, two ports, cement assets, defence manufacturing and prime Mumbai real estate. 

In several cases, the process did not seem to run in a straight line.

These include: An auction that was reopened after a winner had been chosen and its plan filed in court; bidding rules that were rewritten after bids had been opened; and Adani being  designated an “anchor” and given the right to match whatever its rivals offered. In two cases, the committee of creditors that approved the deal had shrunk to a single member. In one, the winning bidder – Adani –  had voted in the creditors’ committee on its own plan – and without its vote, the plan would have failed. 

Amrita Sarkar, an Advocate-on-Record in the Supreme Court and an expert in insolvency law, told us that such instances are not seen so commonly in insolvency cases. Ultimately, she said, the key question is whether the process helps maximise the value of the company, while staying within the law and respecting the CoC’s commercial decision-making.

None of this violated any laws. All the decisions mentioned here were taken by the financial creditors, not the bidder, or approved by a tribunal, upheld, and any challenge that was admitted was dismissed.

But that process is precisely what this report examines.

India’s bankruptcy law – the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – now in its 10th year, hands enormous discretion to a small number of financial creditors (any person or business that is owed money), while limiting how much the courts and tribunals can question their decisions. The money at stake, after all, is significantly public: state banks, government financial institutions and ordinary depositors held a substantial share of the debt across these 16 cases, but recovered only about  25 percent, or less than a third of it. Whether that was the best outcome depends on how effective the competition for these assets was.

How the IBC system works

When an Indian company can’t repay its debts, a creditor can take it to the NCLT. If the tribunal admits the case, control passes out of the owners’ hands. A resolution professional is appointed to run the company. A committee of the company’s financial creditors – banks, financial institutions, etc – takes over the decisions.

Interested buyers then bid. The creditors’ committee picks one. The weight of a creditor’s vote depends on how much it is owed. A resolution plan needs 66 percent of the creditors’ votes to pass. The tribunal then signs off.

Two numbers get calculated by registered valuers at the start. One is fair value, or what the business might fetch in an unhurried sale. Second is liquidation value, which is what its assets could fetch if the business was shut down and sold off. These two figures are the yardsticks against which bids are judged, in terms of how reasonable they are compared to the underlying value of the distressed business.

And one doctrine governs everything: commercial wisdom. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that judges should not second-guess what the creditors’ committee decides is a good deal. If the committee votes for a plan, courts usually do not ask whether a different bid might have been better.

The logic is that a committee comprises several lenders with different priorities. One may want cash now, another may want the business to survive. The vote is supposed to be the product of that argument.

Creditors almost never get back what they lent. The shortfall is called a haircut, and in India it is enormous.

As of March 2026, creditors recovered 30.6 percent of what they were owed in insolvency cases that were resolved through a resolution plan – a haircut of about 69.4 percent. But this recovery was 166.9 percent of the companies’ liquidation value, meaning creditors got much more through resolution than they would have through liquidation.

Across the 16 Adani acquisitions where tribunal orders disclose both admitted claims and recovery, creditors were owed approximately Rs 1.31 lakh crore and recovered only about Rs 33,000 crore – just 25.4 percent of the total. The loss was estimated to be over 97,700 crore, making the haircut around 74.6 percent.  

That is slightly higher than the national average of 69.4 percent. 

Steep haircuts in India’s bankruptcy procedures are hardly confined to the Adani Group – the Subhash Chandra controversy being the latest case in point. And it was primarily created by the borrowers who defaulted and by the years of decay that followed. 

But it matters for a different reason. A significant amount of the money written off in large insolvencies belongs to public sector banks, state-backed financial institutions and insurance companies. Among the creditors across these cases were State Bank of India, Punjab National Bank, Bank of Baroda, Canara Bank, Union Bank of India, ICICI Bank, HDFC and Yes Bank, alongside Power Finance Corporation, REC, IIFCL, EXIM Bank and IFCI. 

The bigger question is, within that already-diminished pool of value, was the process that decided who got the assets, and on what terms, a genuinely competitive one?

Let’s look at the acquisitions.

HDIL: Adani acquires premium 8.8 lakh sq ft BKC project in Mumbai for Rs 3 crore 

➜ The company under liquidation: Housing Development and Infrastructure Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC/the haircut: Rs 3 crore for BKC project and Rs 65 crore for a second project. The reported value of these assets was over Rs 2,000 crore. 

➜ Questions raised: Why was the value of a prime property in Mumbai’s business hub recorded as nil?

Housing Development and Infrastructure Limited (HDIL) entered insolvency in August 2019. Lenders tried to sell the company as a single entity, but received no resolution plan. After nearly two years without a buyer, the committee of creditors voted in August 2021 to liquidate the company.

But that was not how the insolvency ended.

Homebuyer associations challenged the liquidation before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), arguing that if HDIL could not be rescued as a single company, its individual projects could still attract buyers. NCLAT accepted that argument and allowed the insolvency to continue through a project-wise resolution process. HDIL’s assets were divided into 10 separate verticals – each of them different infrastructure projects.

It was through this reconfigured process that Adani Properties acquired two projects – BKC Inspire and Shahad Maharal.

The BKC Inspire project, is an 8.8 lakh sq ft commercial property located in Mumbai’s Bandra Kurla Complex (BKC), one of India’s most valuable business districts. The property’s land parcel includes a slum rehabilitation project. HDIL had been granted the development rights with the condition that they also build free housing to rehabilitate nearby slum dwellers. 

Despite being a premium business hub, the property’s fair value and liquidation value were recorded as nil. The NCLT order did not explain how the valuers concluded that a commercial project in India’s most expensive real-estate market had zero recoverable economic value. 

Adani was the only bidder. With no competition, Adani acquired the BKC Inspire project under a Rs 3 crore resolution plan. Out of this, Rs 2.85 crore was allocated to creditors and Rs 15 lakh towards insolvency resolution process costs. In fact, the value of the mandatory performance bank guarantee prescribed under the bidding documents was more than  the value of Adani’s resolution plan.

For the other project, Shahad Maharal, two bidders participated – Adani Properties and KGK Realty (India) Pvt Ltd. The committee of creditors found KGK’s proposal “not feasible and viable” and approved Adani’s Rs 65 crore resolution plan. The NCLT order does not record the reasons why the competing proposal was considered commercially unviable.

The two HDIL assets that Adani acquired for Rs 68 crore were reportedly worth over 2,000 crore, according to industry experts.

Sources close to the development claimed that in 2008 – long before the insolvency process began – Adani and HDIL had entered into a deal under which HDIL would undertake the rehabilitation and Adani would receive the free-sale Floor Space Index (FSI) – or the built-up area permitted to be sold in the open market. Under the deal, Adani was supposed to pay HDIL about Rs 1,100 crore. HDIL later failed to deliver the promised FSI and faced financial problems, while Adani began construction on the portion of FSI it had received. Newslaundry could not verify the authenticity of these claims.

After disputes over rehabilitation and payments to slum dwellers reached the Bombay High Court, the court in 2021 directed Adani to begin the process of appointing its own entity, Budhpur Buildcon, as co-developer. HDIL subsequently entered insolvency. Sources claim that since Adani was already involved in and controlling the project before the CIRP began, the Rs 3 crore resolution-plan amount was a token payment and not the price paid to acquire the project. 

But the question of why a prime property was valued at zero remains unanswered – irrespective of the fact that the eventual winner was already involved with the project before HDIL entered insolvency. 

Lanco Amarkantak and Jaiprakash Associates: A study in contrast

➜ The company under liquidation: Lanco Amarkantak Power Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC/The haircut: Secured creditors had admitted claims of approximately Rs 14,632 crore but recovered only about Rs 4,101 crore 

➜ Questions raised: After a successful applicant was selected, Adani was allowed to submit an unsolicited bid, which was then declared the winner – this option was not extended to bidders in other cases, such as the Jaiprakash Associates insolvency case.

Across some Adani acquisitions, the framework of the bidding process changed after it had begun.

In some cases, creditors reopened auctions that appeared to have concluded. In others, they introduced a new evaluation process after bids had already been submitted. Meanwhile, competing bidders who sought to improve their offers at a later stage were told the process could not be altered because the rules had to be respected.

For example, thermal power company Lanco Amarkantak Private Limited entered the insolvency process in September 2019. After the first round of bidding failed to produce an acceptable offer, lenders invited fresh expressions of interest in January 2022. Eventually, Adani Power, Reliance Industries and a consortium of Power Finance Corporation and REC submitted resolution plans. After multiple rounds of negotiations, the PFC-REC consortium’s revised offer of Rs 3,020 crore was approved by the Committee of Creditors in December 2022 and its resolution plan was filed before the NCLT for approval in February 2023.

Usually, that would have marked the end of the bidding process.

Instead, while the consortium’s plan was still awaiting NCLT approval, Adani Power, Jindal Power and Megha Engineering sent unsolicited letters offering higher bids. Adani first offered Rs 3,645 crore in October 2023, later increasing it to Rs 4,101 crore in December. After discussing these proposals in three CoC meetings, the creditors unanimously decided to reopen the process. The NCLT granted permission in January 2024 to conduct a fresh challenge process. 

Adani Power was the only bidder in that round and was declared the ‘highest’ bidder. Its resolution plan was approved by the CoC in March 2024 and by the NCLT in August. 

The tribunal order did not explain why unsolicited bids were entertained after a resolution applicant had already been selected. Instead, it cited the need for “minimal judicial interference by the NCLAT and NCLT in the framework of IBC”.

Sarkar stated that such reopening of the process is “rare” and “generally not encouraged”. On changes to bidding rules, she said “the reasoning behind them and procedure followed needed to be examined.”

We spoke to another senior lawyer with two decades of experience handling IBC cases. Requesting anonymity, she stated, “Entertaining unsolicited bids is fairly uncommon in insolvency cases.”

This was in contrast to the approach in the controversial Jaiprakash Associates insolvency proceedings, in which mining giant Vedanta claimed it had been the highest bidder, despite which Adani was selected. Here, the committee of creditors declined to entertain Vedanta’s improved offer on the grounds that the bidding rules treated submitted bids as final. 

As many as 28 companies had expressed interest in the JAL case. By the final deadline in June 2025, the Committee of Creditors was considering resolution plans from five companies – Adani Enterprises, Vedanta, Dalmia Cement, Jindal Power and PNC Infratech. After several rounds of negotiations, only Adani and Vedanta participated in the final challenge process held in September, where bidders were allowed to improve their financial offers. 

On November 10, the CoC commenced voting. Two days earlier, Vedanta had submitted an addendum seeking to improve its offer. The CoC refused to consider it. It cited the process note (bidding rules for the case), which stated that once the challenge process ended, the bids would become “unconditional and irrevocable” and could not be revised further. Eventually, Adani’s resolution plan was approved with 93.81 percent of the voting share and the NCLT approved it on March 17, 2026. Vedanta chairman Anil Agarwal told the media that Vedanta was publicly declared the highest bidder for JAL, but the decision was later changed in favour of Adani. Vedanta challenged the decision before the NCLAT. These appeals were dismissed by NCLAT in May 2026, with the NCLAT holding that the NCLT had committed no error. The Supreme Court too had earlier refused to stay the NCLT’s decision.

In the Lanco Amarkantak insolvency, secured creditors – those with their loans backed by specific collaterals unlike unsecured creditors – had admitted claims of approximately Rs 14,632 crore. But they recovered about Rs 4,101 crore under Adani's resolution plan. Information on the recovery and losses of unsecured creditors was not available in the tribunal records reviewed. 

In JAL, the financial creditors admitted claims of over Rs 57,497 crore and recovered merely around Rs 13,982 crore from Adani’s resolution plan. 

Dighi Port: NCLT orders ‘modifications’ to plan, and the original winner walks away

➜ Company under liquidation: Dighi Port Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC/The haircut: The admitted claims stood at Rs 3,056 crore but the creditors were paid only Rs 650 crore. The haircut was 78.7%. 

➜ Questions raised: NCLT-ordered modifications to the winner’s plan, ministries refused to give bank guarantee to the winner. The CoC then reopened bidding, allowing Adani to submit a revised offer and emerge as the successful bidder.

The Dighi Port in Maharashtra entered the corporate insolvency resolution process in March 2018 after the Mumbai bench of the NCLT admitted an insolvency petition filed by DBM Geotechnics & Constructions Limited. Three companies submitted resolution plans by November 2018: Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone (APSEZ) and the Veritas Consortium. 

Although APSEZ’s plan received the highest score under the evaluation criteria, it was rejected by 99.38 percent of the CoC. JNPT’s plan was then approved by the same 99.38 percent majority and placed before the NCLT for approval in February 2019.

The bidding process then took an unusual turn in May. The NCLT approved JNPT's plan but ordered certain modifications. It also directed JNPT to indicate whether it accepted those changes. 

On June 25, 2019, JNPT informed the tribunal that it was unwilling to accept the modified terms. Although the order does not mention the suggested modifications, it is important to note that the shipping and finance ministries had refused a bank guarantee to JNPT.

The Committee of Creditors then reopened the bidding process. At its meeting in July, the CoC decided to give all three bidders – JNPT, APSEZ and the Veritas Consortium – another chance to submit revised offers. 

APSEZ and Veritas submitted an improved offer while JNPT chose not to revise its bid. Around the same time, Dighi Port’s promoters approached NCLAT seeking a settlement and withdrawal of the insolvency proceedings. The CoC, however, voted against withdrawing the insolvency proceedings. It then approved APSEZ’s revised resolution plan with 99.68 percent of the voting share in September. The NCLT approved the plan on  March 5, 2020. 

The senior lawyer quoted above said, “The NCLT typically cannot order modifications. Its scope and power is limited. There are a very few instances where NCLTs have suggested changes. It's definitely an anomaly and not within the spirit of the IBC code.”

Newslaundry talked to Ankita Saxena, an insolvency consultant, certified mediator and founder of IBC Unplugged, a platform focussed on insolvency insights. She commented, “Yes, it is an anomaly. NCLT is overstepping here. It is not allowed to comment on the resolution plan. Under IBC, the commercial wisdom of CoC is of paramount importance.”

In the Dighi Port insolvency, the financial creditors lost around Rs 2,406 crore out of total admitted claims of approximately Rs 3,056 crore.

Vidarbha: The process changed after resolution plans were submitted 

➜ Company under liquidation: Vidarbha Industries Power Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC/The haircut: Secured creditors had admitted claims of approximately Rs 6,200 crore but recovered only about Rs 3,706 crore. Information on the recovery and losses of unsecured creditors was not available in the tribunal records reviewed.

➜ Questions raised: After four bidders submitted plans, the CoC introduced a new “anchor bidder” mechanism and gave Adani Power the right to match or improve competing bids. 

Power company Vidarbha Industries Power, a subsidiary of Anil Ambani’s Reliance Power, entered the corporate insolvency resolution process in September 2024 after the NCLT admitted a petition originally filed by Axis Bank in 2020. State Bank of India (SBI) also filed a petition for the same in November 2022.

By December 26, 2024, four companies – Adani Power, NTPC, Vedanta and Capri Global – submitted resolution plans for Vidarbha Industries Power. But three days after the bids were opened, the committee of creditors issued a process note requiring all bidders to resubmit their commercial offers in a uniform format. NTPC refused to revise its offer. The process changed again in February 2025. 

Then at its eighth meeting, the CoC introduced an “anchor bidder” mechanism, or a “challenge process”  and designated Adani Power as the anchor bidder. Under the new framework, the other bidders had to submit offers at least Rs 50 crore higher than the anchor bid, after which Adani was given six hours to match or improve the highest competing offer.

Subsequently, the sole-member CoC consisting of CFM Asset Reconstruction Private approved Adani Power’s resolution plan in February 2025, and the NCLT approved it on June 18, 2025. The NCLT order did not explain why Adani was chosen as an anchor bidder or whether the role was available to the other bidders. 

Saxena said, “It’s not common. The bidding process and its terms have to be clearly laid out upfront. Once the prescribed process is over, the CoC cannot simply go back and reopen bidding outside the framework.”

Secured creditors had admitted claims of approximately Rs 6,200 crore but recovered only about Rs 3,706 crore under Adani's resolution plan. Information on the recovery and losses of unsecured creditors was not available in the tribunal records reviewed. 

Coastal Energen: The alleged ‘backdoor entry’

➜ Company under liquidation: Coastal Energen Private Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC/The haircut: Secured financial creditors had admitted claims of approximately Rs 11,677 crore but recovered only about Rs 3,330 crore. The only unsecured financial creditors disclosed in the tribunal order had admitted claims of approximately Rs 107 crore and received no payment under the resolution plan. Together, these creditors suffered a total loss of around 8,454 crore.

➜ Questions raised: Adani Power’s own late bid was rejected, but it subsequently entered the race through a consortium led by DAIT, effectively allowing it a ‘backdoor entry’ despite its earlier disqualification.

Energy company Coastal Energen entered the insolvency process in February 2022 after the Chennai bench of the NCLT admitted State Bank of India’s insolvency petition. 

The process was stalled for nearly 10 months due to litigation until it resumed in January 2023. By August 2023, three companies had submitted resolution plans. They were Sherisha Technologies, Jindal Power, and Dickey Alternative Investment Trust (DAIT) in consortium with Adani Power. The Committee of Creditors approved the DAIT-Adani consortium’s resolution plan of 3,335 crore with 97.8 percent of the voting share, and the NCLT approved it in August 2024.

The acquisition, however, drew objections from Coastal Energen’s promoter Ahmad Buhari over the structure of the successful resolution applicant. Buhari was arrested by the ED in a money-laundering case arising from an alleged coal overvaluation scam, a month after Coastal Energen had entered insolvency in February 2022.

According to the objections filed before the NCLT, Adani Power had earlier submitted its own expression of interest, but it was rejected for being filed after the deadline. Despite that, Buhari argued, Adani re-entered the process through a consortium with DAIT, whose expression of interest had been accepted. He alleged this was a “backdoor entry”, claiming that Adani had gained indirectly what it could not secure on its own.

Buhari also questioned DAIT’s financial capacity. He argued that although DAIT held a 51 percent stake in the consortium, its committed fund size was only about Rs 340 crore, much lower than the roughly Rs 1,700 crore it would have to contribute to the Rs 3,330.88 crore-resolution plan. He alleged that the consortium therefore relied on Adani Power for funding despite DAIT being the lead partner. 

The NCLT rejected these objections. It accepted the CoC’s argument that DAIT had disclosed from the outset that it could partner with a technical or strategic investor. The tribunal found no procedural violation and approved the resolution plan on August 30, 2024. 

On the alleged “backdoor entry,” Saxena said that it is “certainly uncommon”. 

In the Coastal Energen insolvency, secured financial creditors had admitted claims of approximately Rs 11,677 crore but recovered only about Rs 3,330 crore under Adani’s resolution plan. The only unsecured financial creditors disclosed in the tribunal order had admitted claims of approximately Rs 107 crore and received no payment under the resolution plan. 

Karaikal Port: When the committee disappeared

➜ The company under liquidation: Karaikal Port Private Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC/The haircut: Financial creditors admitted claims of around Rs 2,959 crore and recovered around Rs 1,580 crore from Adani’s resolution plan. They suffered a total loss of approximately Rs 1,379 crore.

➜ Questions raised: One of the creditors alleged that Adani Ports would indirectly acquire control over the committee of creditors, a charge NCLT dismissed; the committee then became a single creditor.

The committee of creditors, comprising banks, financial institutions and asset reconstruction companies, is expected to bring different commercial interests to the table. The law assumes that the final vote would reflect a negotiation among these competing interests.

This assumption doesn’t always hold – it didn’t in at least three cases of Adani’s insolvency acquisitions. A single creditor controlled enough voting power to determine the outcome on its own. In two of these cases, the committee ultimately consisted of only a single member. Even in such situations, NCLT continued to apply the doctrine of “commercial wisdom,” despite the decision coming from one dominant lender rather than a deliberative body of creditors.

The multi-cargo Karaikal Port in Puducherry had entered the corporate insolvency resolution process in April 2022. The committee was constituted with just two financial creditors – Omkara Assets Reconstruction Private Limited, which held 96.60 percent of the voting share, and Phoenix ARC Private Limited, which held the remaining 3.40 percent. Omkara already possessed more than the 66 percent voting threshold required under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code to approve a resolution plan.

Before the first CoC meeting, Phoenix approached the NCLT in May 2022 alleging that “the initiation of CIRP proceedings were fraudulent or malicious”. Phoenix argued that Adani Ports, as an applicant, would indirectly acquire control over the committee through Omkara ARC. It sought an investigation into alleged transactions involving Omkara ARC, Karaikal Port and Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone, and asked the tribunal to recall its order admitting the company into CIRP. 

The NCLT did not accept these submissions. 

It held that the allegations were based on conjecture and imposed Rs 5 lakh in costs on Phoenix in order to “dissuade other applicants from filing similar” applications and “wasting the judicial time of the tribunal”. NCLT directed that the amount be paid to the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund.

Thereafter, the committee did not remain a committee for long. After the first CoC meeting, Phoenix assigned its debt to Omkara, giving Omkara 100 percent of the voting share. From that point onwards, every commercial decision was taken by Omkara alone, including the approval to the resolution plan submitted by Adani Ports.

The NCLT validated Adani Ports’ resolution plan in March 2023. The order, however, did not discuss how the principle of the Committee of Creditors' “commercial wisdom” applied when every commercial decision was effectively taken by a single financial creditor.

Lawyers and experts told Newslaundry that a single-member CoC is not uncommon under the IBC, particularly when one creditor acquires the debt of others. But in the Karaikal case, the issue assumes significance because of Phoenix’s allegation that Adani Ports could indirectly influence the CoC through Omkara ARC.

In this case, financial creditors admitted claims of around Rs 2,959 crore and recovered around Rs 1,580 crore from Adani’s resolution plan.

Korba West: Adani voted for its own resolution plan

➜ Company under liquidation: Korba West Power Company Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC / The haircut: Financial creditors had admitted claims of approximately 5,032 crore but recovered only about 2,785 crore 

➜ Questions raised: Adani was already the largest financial creditor of the company it was bidding for.

The insolvency mechanism is built around the central principle of competition. 

Across at least two Adani acquisitions, NCLT records point to situations where Adani group companies had already acquired a financial or operational foothold in the distressed companies before their resolution plan was approved. 

For example, the Korba West Power Company in Chhattisgarh. It filed its own insolvency application before the Ahmedabad bench of the NCLT and entered the corporate insolvency resolution process in July 2018. After the bids were opened, 10 companies expressed their interest, and seven were found eligible. By early 2019, three companies, including Adani Power, submitted their resolution plans.

But Adani Power was not merely competing to acquire the company. It was also its largest financial creditor. 

By March 2019, Adani Power held 37.33 percent of the voting share in the Committee of Creditors – more than any other lender. On April 1, the plan was approved by the committee with 69.08 percent of the voting share, just above the 66 percent threshold.

In June 2019, the NCLT too approved the plan. While the NCLT order recorded that Adani Power was both a financial creditor and the successful resolution applicant, it did not discuss whether Adani’s dual role raised any potential conflict of interest. The senior lawyer mentioned above said, “Creditors acting as resolution applicants is not legally prohibited, but it is uncommon.”

Saxena, however, said, “Creditors acting as resolution applicants is not legally prohibited as long as Section 29A is not violated.”

In the Korba West Power insolvency, financial creditors had admitted claims of approximately Rs 5,032 crore but recovered only about Rs 2,785 crore under the resolution plan.

Radius Estates: Bidder, builder and financier

➜ Company under liquidation: Radius Estates And Developers Private Limited

➜ Price Adani paid via IBC / The haircut: The admitted claims amounted to Rs 1,892 crore but they were paid only 32 crores. Haircut 98.3 percent.

➜ Questions raised: Adani already had an operational role in the project it was bidding for.

Mumbai-based real estate firm Radius Estates and Developers entered the corporate insolvency resolution process in April 2021, after the Mumbai bench of the NCLT admitted an insolvency petition filed by the financial creditor Beacon Trusteeship Limited. 

The company was co-developing a Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) redevelopment project in Bandra (East). But in January 2020, after the developer ran into financial difficulties, the construction had come to a halt. If work did not resume, the housing society that owned the land could terminate the project, putting the interests of lenders and more than 200 homebuyers at risk.

But even before the insolvency process was opened to bidders, the CoC began considering Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited for a key operational role.

At its third meeting in September 2021, the CoC considered a proposal from Radius Estates’ joint venture partner, MIG (Bandra) Realtors and Builders Pvt Ltd, to appoint Adani Infrastructure and Developers Pvt Ltd as the construction manager for the stalled project. The project was discussed again in the fourth and fifth CoC meetings.

The formal bidding process was initiated in October 2021, with two companies submitting expressions of interest – Adani Goodhomes Private Limited and a consortium of Ashdan Properties Private Limited and Ashdan Developers Private Limited. However, by November 2021, the CoC was informed that the Ashdan consortium did not satisfy the eligibility criteria and had withdrawn from the process. Adani Goodhomes was left as the only eligible resolution applicant.

The overlap between Adani’s operational role and its role as a bidder became more pronounced by December 2021. While considering Adani Goodhomes’ resolution plan, the CoC simultaneously approved the appointment of Adani Infrastructure as the project’s construction manager and the provider of interim finance. By the end of December, the CoC had approved all this with 83.93 percent of the voting share.

The NCLT approved the resolution plan on January 9, 2023. The order, however, did not discuss the implications of Adani’s multiple roles and whether they gave rise to any potential conflict of interest. In the Radius Estates insolvency, financial creditors had admitted claims of approximately 1,892 crore but recovered only about 32 crore under Adani’s resolution plan, resulting in a loss of more than 1,860 crore.

Sources close to the development said after Radius Estates took loans but failed to complete construction. Adani stepped in, borrowed Rs 1,000 crore against the project and completed the construction. It acted as construction manager, earning 12 percent (about 300 crore), while sales proceeds went towards repaying lenders. When the project entered CIRP, the sources argue, Adani’s existing role made it the natural choice to complete and sell the project.

To our queries, Jugeshinder Singh, Chief Financial Officer, Adani Group responded, “No comment on market action.” 

*In the Coastal Energen Pvt Ltd case, Adani consortium won and implemented the resolution plan but NCLT approval is under challenge, with the matter pending before NCLAT.

**These numbers are based on the publicly available data on IBBI and NCLT websites. They do not claim to be all comprehensive.

The analysis of success rate is based on records that were accessible and identifiable through these sources at the time of reporting. This is not an exhaustive account of all insolvency acquisitions involving Adani Group entities, as the relevant records may not be comprehensively available or indexed on these websites.