The situation after the ‘surgical strikes’ on the intervening night of September 28-29 is surreal and bizarre. India conducted deliberate trans-Line of Control (LOC) Special Forces (SF) operations, one to three km deep, to destroy about seven terrorist ‘launch pads’ on a 250-km arch from Kel to Bhimber, inflicting “significant” casualties. India also declared that it had done so through a formal briefing by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) — a first apart from the three wars of 1947-48,1965 and 1971. Even in 1999, India maintained the ‘sanctity’ of the LOC.

Pakistan, which is extremely sensitive to any unusual movement of the Indian Army even within India let alone across the LOC, categorically denied that any trans-LOC operations had taken place. Director General Inter Services Public Relations, Lieutenant

General Asim Bajwa, said only heavy trans-LOC firing had taken place in which two Pakistani soldiers were killed in action. One Indian Army soldier belonging to 37 Rashtriya Rifles (RR) who “inadvertently strayed across the LOC” (according to the Indian Army) was “apprehended” as stated by the Pakistan Army.

Pakistan went to the extent of taking domestic and foreign correspondents to the “supposed” launch pads to prove its point. Despite the DGMO, Indian Army, having given only a terse statement in standard military language bereft of any details, the Indian media went berserk speculating how the operations were conducted and the immense damage inflicted. Pakistan responded by ridiculing the claims and asked for evidence to be furnished. The international media reported both the Indian “claims” and Pakistani “doubts”.

Indian public and politicians celebrated the benchmark ‘surgical strikes’ and raised the jingoistic rhetoric to a new high. Posters (allegedly put up by the ruling political party at the Centre) highlighting the retribution inflicted on Pakistan appeared in poll-bound Uttar Pradesh. In response, while unequivocally supporting the surgical strikes, the opposition parties highlighted that similar strikes have been carried out covertly in the past under the policy of ‘strategic restraint’, and further put the ruling party in a bind by asking it to release the evidence to counter Pakistan’s malicious propaganda and international scepticism.

If that was not enough, since September 28/29, three terrorist attacks and a couple of infiltration attempts have taken place in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

So, what does one make of this situation?

It is Information Warfare in full play by the strategic decision makers and Armed Forces on both sides. The media, which revels in scoops, ‘inside information’ and free access, had no choice but to report the official version and speculate. On either side, military spokesmen have been economical with words and followed a planned script. The media, including the social media and the public at large, took the bait, hook line and sinker. The resultant confusion notwithstanding, the fallout is that both sides have retained enough manoeuvre space to pursue their long-term strategy.

I had earlier written two columns: “How to solve a problem like Pakistan” on August 2 and “How should India respond to 18/9” on September 21. The former focussed on likely long-term strategies of India and Pakistan in generic terms and the latter in more specific terms after the Uri attack. I recommend that the readers scan these pieces while reading this column.

Pakistan caught off guard

Pakistan, owing to its birth on religious grounds, the deprivation of J&K including the control of river waters and its dismemberment in 1971 considers India as an adversary state. It follows an unambiguous India-centric National Security Strategy backed by military, political and public consensus. Its essential features are:

• Wage a deniable Fourth Generation War (4GW) in J&K and hinterland of India exploiting its fault lines.
• Quid pro quo response to Indian threat below threshold of war in the form of surgical air/drone/missile strikes and Special Forces (SF) operations.
• Control India-sponsored 4GW (as Pakistan perceives it) in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the hinterland, and expose it diplomatically.
• Avoid a conventional war and if it is forced upon it, stalemate India with conventional capability, ‘irrational’ nuclear brinkmanship, and actual use of tactical nuclear weapons if required.
• Neutralise India’s influence in Afghanistan by facilitating Taliban’s return to power.
• Back the above strategy with diplomacy and special relationship with China, Islamic countries and the US.

Is Pakistan’s conduct after the surgical strikes in consonance with this strategy? The answer is an unambiguous yes.

Pakistan is used to the Indian Army’s undeclared retributive, trans-LOC operations. It noted with concern the symbolism and import of India’s declared trans-LOC ‘surgical strikes’ on terrorist launch pads. It realised that India was targeting the domestic and international constituency, and also aimed at forcing an irrational response from Pakistan to show that it controls and sponsors the ‘non-state actors’.

Pakistan was taken by surprise. It was focussing on defending its posts and military installations after 18/9. But India struck at unlikely targets. No Indian soldier was killed, no body was left behind. No prisoner of war was taken except the RR soldier who was either part of the support operations or simply a victim of the fog of war. India had also showcased its world-class capability to meticulously execute Special Forces (SF) operations.

Casualties suffered were substantial — 30 to 50 terrorists had been killed (author’s assumption). Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) also noted the anger of the leadership of its proxies, the Lashkar- e-Taiba (LET), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM ) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) .

Keeping the above in mind, the Pakistan Army re-calibrated its strategy. Bodies of terrorists, all of whom were from Punjab, were removed in haste to be buried later in nondescript villages in Punjab. The local population, which is either ideologically committed or dependent upon the Pakistan Army for jobs, was taken into confidence. The surgical strikes were out rightly denied to prevent India from taking any domestic and international advantage.

Pakistan ridiculed the entire operation and termed it a ‘hoax’. The same line was followed by the Pakistan media and public. To add insult to the injury, it orchestrated three terrorist strikes in J&K and stepped up infiltration, daring India to respond again. In a nutshell, Pakistan has adhered to its strategy and retained all strategic options as highlighted above. It has prevented the situation from escalating and diffused the post-18/9 stand-off by not immediately resorting to a quid pro quo. It perceives that it has called India’s bluff and denied it any domestic or international strategic advantage, and has put it on the back foot to provide evidence of the strikes.

Be that as it may, Pakistan from now on will have to take note of the change in India’s strategy — that India will not hesitate to raise the ante by pre-emptively or reactively countering Pakistan’s 4GW in India, in a calibrated manner with punitive operations across the LOC or the International Boundary — a watershed moment, a paradigm shift in strategy!

India changes the game

In my column dated September 21, I had highlighted India’s options after the 18/9 terrorist attack at Uri:

• Punitive operations below the threshold of war focussed on targets related to prosecution of 4GW by Pakistan.
• Wage a counter 4GW in Pakistan exploiting its fault lines.
• Wage a pre-emptive J&K-centric limited war to compel Pakistan to stop 4GW in J&K and hinterland of India.

I had also highlighted that the first option is a short-term option and the latter two are long-term options. I further emphasised that carrying out punitive operations below the threshold of war was a strategic compulsion to assuage public rage and for the sake of national morale and had to be carried out at the earliest but not later than 10 days.

On the intervening night of September 28/29, exactly 11 days after 18/9, the Indian Army SF struck across the LOC on six/seven terrorist launch pads, destroyed the terrorist infrastructure and inflicted “significant casualties” on terrorists. The operation was meticulously planned and professionally executed. All SF teams de-inducted safely and suffered only one SF soldier who was wounded owing to a mine blast.

Needless to mention that to enable the SF operation, supporting operations were conducted by troops manning the LOC in the form firing and physical containment using patrols and Ghatak Platoons. Having read in detail about all major SF operations over the last 100 years, I have no hesitation in saying that this operation had professionalism written over each and every aspect — political aim, political and military decision making, intelligence, secrecy, choice of targets, conduct and the official statement.

War or use of force as an instrument of policy is always in pursuit of a political aim. India’s long-term political aim is simple — prevent Pakistan from interfering in internal affairs of India through a 4GW and if it does so, maintain good relations for common good. A war of retribution, if it does not compel the adversary to accept peace on your terms, is a war without an aim and serves no purpose. The political aims of the surgical strikes was, however, limited in scope:

• To send a clear signal to the international community that the threshold of India’s patience had been reached to warrant the exercising of hard options and that the onus of exerting diplomatic pressure on Pakistan was on the international community.
• To send a clear signal to Pakistan with respect to the change in India’s strategy and that India will respond to the 4GW in a calibrated manner with punitive operations across the LOC/IB.
• Retribution on Pakistan for terrorist attack on 18/9 with targets restricted to terrorists and their infrastructure.
• Force Pakistan to respond in an irrational manner and raise the ante to inflict more retribution.
• Demonstrate India’s capability for world-class SF operations.
• Assuage public anger and uplift national morale.
• Reap domestic political dividend.

Since 1990, a fair number of proactive or reactive operations have been conducted across the LOC with or without government sanction. However, keeping in view the stated government policy of ‘strategic restraint’, all these operations remained classified. “Alea iacta est — the die is cast,” said Julius Cesar on crossing the Rubicon.

The import of this operation is not in the number of enemy casualties and the infrastructure destroyed or the depth and frontage of the operation or the type of weapons used. It lies in the declaration of India’s intent for dealing with the 4GW perpetrated by Pakistan in the future.

Therein also lies the burden of expectations from the public and the media, which would want a punitive response to every 4GW action of Pakistan. By all counts, this operation so far appears to have been a standalone and one-off operation as a signal of strategic intent and for retribution, and not part of a strategy for progressive escalation to a limited war. This operation was also contingent upon Pakistan’s outrage and irrational response wherein more retribution would have been unleashed on him. However, Pakistan did not oblige.

So, what has India achieved?

• A clear signal of strategic intent to Pakistan that India will respond to the 4GW by punitive operations across the LOC/IB.
• A signal to the international community that India’s threshold of patience has been crossed and the onus is on them to exert economic and political pressure on Pakistan.
• A demonstration of Indian military prowess and ability to conduct world-class SF operations.
• Assuaged public anger and uplifted national morale.
• Demonstrated political will to take hard decisions.

Baton passes from Indian Army to politicians

As opposed to the brilliant SF operation, the political management of the aftermath was an unmitigated disaster. Jingoistic political and public emotions were allowed to run wild. No effort was made to rein in the more-than-compliant media.

To the contrary, it was egged on by the credible and not so credible leaks to raise war hysteria knowing fully well that sooner than later, it will emerge that it was a one-off operation to signal a strategic intent. A junior minister commented on the use of helicopters leading to more speculation. The Raksha Mantri, of all the people, said the Indian Army like Hanuman had awakened to rediscover its prowess. Without any complementary mobilisation of the Armed Forces, the evacuation of villages in Punjab up to 10 km from the international border, made the action politically suspect.

In such situations, only the PM or the RM should make a terse and clear political statement and leave it at that. Political capital was already on the table. Now it is lost in the shrillness of election rhetoric. Pakistan’s smart response and our political frenzy have diluted the gains of this watershed SF operation.

Prognosis

So, are we back to business as usual? The answer is yes, but with a rider that now our response to 4GW will be in the form of calibrated trans LOC/IB operations. These will continue to be at a “time, place, and scale of own choosing” and calibrated according to the situation.

Pakistan’s strategy will see no change. In fact, it perceives the events from September 18 to September 29 as a tactical victory. The probabilities of a limited war that may alter the current impasse are very low. Neither India nor Pakistan has so far shown any inclination to further raise the ante. We are likely to see a quiet period before Pakistan responds in the form of a major terrorist strike. However, in J&K, Pakistan will continue with business as usual, daring India to respond again.

For India, it has gained precious time to formalise its National Security Strategy and initiate long overdue structural and organisational reforms in the Armed Forces, Central Armed Police Forces and the State Police to cater for internal and external threats.

Last but not the least, it was heartening to note the political, public and media support for the Armed Forces. I only hope that it translates into removing the anomalies of the Seventh Pay Commission.